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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on understanding and explaining the change of Turkish foreign policy,
particularly in the last decade. Many observers have expressed a suspicion that Turkey is
abandoning its Western-centric alignment and gradually shifting its axis. The thesis argues that
rather than a shift, Turkey is taking an independent position. It maintains that the end of the Cold
War and the change in the international structure from bipolarity to unipolarity has provided
incentives for countries with some degree of material capabilities to pursue independence from the
U.S. policy preferences.
This study analyses structural effects on the behavior of Turkey. Later it associates the
observed change in Turkey’s foreign policy as the outcomes of taking an independent position to
maximize its objectives. Finally, it presents empirical research to prove the argument.

v

INTRODUCTION

Since 2009, there has been heated debate about recent changes in Turkish foreign policy
(TFP). Turkish policies like the hosting of Hamas leaders in Ankara, the severing of relations with
Israel, a vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) against sanctions on Iran, and the
development of a close relationship with Sudan have all contributed to a weakening of relations
with the West. Furthermore, some argue that Turkey’s increased interactions with Russia and
China are evidence that Turkey is detaching itself from the West.
This study aims to reveal why Turkish foreign policy has been transformed in the period
2009-2018 and what lies behind the perceived change. In the last decade in particular, many
observers have expressed a suspicion that Turkey is abandoning its Western-centric alignment,
gradually shifting its axis. Some argue that this change is the result of an Islamist-oriented
administration’s ideological commitments (Altunisik, Meliha & Tur, 2004a; Altunisik, Meliha &
Tur, 2004b; Benli Altunisik, 2009; Pipes, 1993; Yanık, 2011). Others see in current Turkish
foreign policy signs of neo-Ottomanism, a reawakening of Turkey’s hegemonic desires. Many
champions of social and institutional analysis argue that elites’ increased emphasis on the legacy
of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic identity of the nation have caused the change
(Constantinides, 1996; Erşen, 2013; Taspinar, 2008; Walker, 2009; Yavuz, 1998).
The central argument of this thesis is that these explanations largely overlook structural
changes in the region and their effects on Turkey’s behavior. Since the end of the Cold War, the
regional international order has been unipolar, with the United States as the sole superpower, an
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actor unchecked by another equivalent peer state. This structure has provided the opportunity for
Washington to pursue interventionist policies in the Middle East that have become the primary
source of instability in the region. Confronted by unrelenting wars and sanctions in its close
neighborhood that have been instigated by the U.S., Ankara realized that a dependent alliance with
Washington is not solving its problems anymore.
This thesis also asserts that the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) is enabled
by Turkey’s growing material capabilities, which allow its government to adopt a more
independent position to maximize its objectives. The observed change is a reflection of Turkey’s
government centralizing national interests rather than prioritizing relations with the U.S. and the
West. In that context; the work reveals that Ankara has adopted a more autonomous strategy that
visibly contrasts with its previous submissive attitude.
The study is organized into four parts. Chapter 1 offers a background to the argument
through a historical perspective. It analyzes the evolution of Turkish foreign policy from the
Republic’s establishment to 2019 in order to describe the transformation from a West-centric
foreign policy to the new policy, which has been subjected to so much criticism. Chapter 2 reviews
the literature regarding different explanations for this foreign policy change. This part of the work
points out a serious gap in the literature, in particular a lack of system-unit level explanations.
Chapter 3 attempts to prove that a unipolar systemic structure incentivizes countries with adequate
material capability to adopt a self-help approach. It devises and tests a mechanism to explain the
behaviors of Middle Eastern states. In Chapter 4, the study endeavors to prove that Turkish foreign
policy makers have adopted an independent position to maximize Turkey’s objectives. In the
conclusion, the work highlights some of the major findings, points out the major contribution of
this study, and offers some topics for future work.
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CHAPTER ONE:
BACKGROUND FOR TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH WEST

Introduction
This Chapter will explain the reasons behind Turkey's West-centric orientation and the
contemporary arguments about the change in its preferences. The general purpose is to define
historical foreign policy attitudes of the country against systemic pressures of international
structure. Firstly, it will cover the elite's motives, which endorsed fast rapprochement with
important European countries just after the independence war that took place against them. The
second part will focus on Turkey's behavior during the Cold War and the subsequent existential
Soviet threat that bolstered the desire of Ankara to form institutional ties with the West. The third
part will account for Turkey's Middle East policies as part of the Western security organization.
Later, the study will cover the period when the security threat decreased, and the eagerness to
reformulate Turkish foreign policy has strengthened. The final part will aim at recalling the most
significant current issues that have ignited a wide-spread debate regarding the new orientation of
TFP.

The Fledgling Republic’s Pillars: The Status quo, Restraint, and Westernization
The mindset of the Turkish founding fathers that gave direction to Turkey’s foreign policy
(TFP) was forged by two inescapable factors. Foremost, since the regression period, the Ottoman
rulers’ priority had been modernizing the Empire’s military structure in the fashion of European
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armies, which exposed soldiers to the Western institutional mindset. Therefore, the military was
the pioneer in reforming the state. Second, during WWI, some ambitious Ottoman statesmen
pursued policies without considering the existing gap between their objectives and the Empire’s
capabilities, which increased the suffering of the nation and pushed the country to the brink of total
annihilation(Ulgul, 2017).
Ataturk, a former Ottoman Army general with high intelligence, had already espoused a
Western mindset and believed it important that leaders be realistic when establishing policies and
set goals that were within reach of the nation’s resources. After the successful War of
Independence, he was aware of the nation’s significantly depleted resources and human capital.
Therefore, as the leader of the national struggle and the newly emerged Turkish Republic, Ataturk
prioritized the consolidation of gains and the modernization of the country. At his direction, the
foreign policy of the new Turkish state was established on two principles: Westernization1 and
maintenance of the status quo(Ucarol, 2008).
According to Ulgul, after the War of Independence, Turkey sought to re-establish close
relations with the Western powers for practical and ideological reasons. Practically, these states
became neighbors due to the League of Nations’ colonial mandate regimes of Great Britain and
France in Iraq and Syria. Turkey was insufficiently powerful to systematically oppose these
powers in its pursuit of its goal of resolving the remaining problems of the Lausanne treaty after
July 1923. Thus, the leaders of the country preferred diplomacy over aggressive strategies, which
facilitated the resolution of issues related to the Treaty of Lausanne and the development of close
relations with the Western world. Turkey positioned itself as a defender of the status quo by
prioritizing policies that respected regional borders and territorial integrity.

The term “Westernization” is used to describe efforts to achieve the civilization level of the developed countries
through emulating the administrative and social structures of those states.
1
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Ideologically, the political elites considered that being part of Western civilization was the
only way to modernize the country. They felt that a stable international environment and good
relations with the great powers were essential to the success of the comprehensive reforms aimed
at building a secular nation-state. Thus, Turkish foreign policy favored close relations with the
West, seeing such relations as crucial to overcoming the fledgling state’s internal and external
challenges.
After WWI, when Europe began to witness revisionist nationalist leaders such as Mussolini
and Hitler, Turkish partnership became more valuable to the supporters of the status quo. Great
Britain and France began to feel pressure inside Europe, which incentivized them to make
concessions in more peripheral issues (Ucarol, 2008). Using the change in political environment,
Turkey managed to resolve border issues like Hatay with France and Mosul with Britain via
diplomacy. In turn, Ankara received their support for the Montreux Convention regarding the
Turkish Straits (Hale, 2013). The pursuit of development through Westernization, preference for
the status quo and the peaceful approach towards the major powers in resolving controversial
regional issues enabled Turkey to develop close relations with the West.

Existential Threats (WWII, USSR): Flexibility, Engagements, Alignment
During WWII, although it favored the status quo bloc, Turkey adopted “active neutrality”
towards the warring states as a way to stay out of the war (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016). However,
in the aftermath of the war, the increasing Soviet threat encouraged Ankara to prioritize a securityoriented approach, which bolstered its desire to seek closer relations with “The Allies.” This trend
encouraged Ankara to seek institutional integration with the U.S.-led West. (Hatipoglu & Palmer,
2016)
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The USSR’s clear intention to expand communism to Turkey forced Ankara to forgo a
neutrality strategy and align itself with the ideologically closer West. When the Soviet regime had
begun to occupy the Eastern and Central European countries, it started to put pressure on Turkey,
Iran, and Greece; Ankara associated itself with the U.S., which was the only country capable of
resisting the USSR(tarihbilimi.gen.tr, 2015).
Turkish security concerns peaked when the Soviet Union demanded mutual control over
the Gallipoli and Bosporus straits and increased its naval activities in the Black Sea. In order to
cope with the situation, Turkish officials sought support from Washington and London.
Meanwhile, as the Soviet Union had become a major security threat, the U.S. formulated its new
policy of “containment,” in which Turkey was granted a significant role.
In this context, the 1947 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, which were enacted to
increase the ability of threatened countries to resist Soviet aggression, facilitated the establishment
of military and economic ties between Turkey and the U.S. Ankara actively worked to build a
more sustainable and institutional alliance with the West and was eager to become a NATO
member since its foundation in 1949. However, this desire was hampered, especially by the
Scandinavian states and Britain, which were concerned about the possibility of being entangled in
a war outside of Europe. These states argued that the acceptance of an underdeveloped Muslim
Turkey in NATO would deteriorate the unity of the Transatlantic Alliance and that the
modernization of the Turkish army would require a significant amount of financial support
(Yilmaz, S., 2006).
However, two crucial development changed the unfavorable strategic environment that
allowed Turkey to become a member of NATO. First, during the 1950 election, the long-ruling
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP; Republican People Party or RPP) lost the elections, and the
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Democrat Party took control. This incident was perceived as proof that Turkey had a functioning
democracy. Second, the newly elected Democrat Party leaders swiftly decided to dispatch a
regiment to support South Korea following the UN Security Council Resolution 82 in 1950. In this
war, the effective fighting capacity of the Turkish forces and the decisiveness of the government
increased Turkey’s prestige and its standing in the international arena (Bilgin, 2009). Sending
troops to Korea was an early example of a decision that indicated Turkish foreign policy was
shifting toward “engagements” as a part of the Western world.
Seeing it as a timely opportunity, Turkish officials sent a request for admittance to NATO
in August 1950. Because of the military advantages the location of Turkey could provide the
alliance, reinforcing NATO’s Southern Flank (NATO, 2018) and forcing the USSR to divert forces
from Europe, the U.S. sponsored the entry of Greece and Turkey as full members of NATO.
However, Britain, intimately concerned with the security of the Suez Canal, had contemplated
forming an organization within which Turkey would have an important role, and London insisted
on accepting Turkey’s membership to NATO only if Ankara showed a willingness to participate
in those British regional arrangements (Yilmaz, S., 2012). In the end, after Turkey and Britain
agreed on cooperation in the Middle East, London yielded to the U.S. pressures and accepted
Turkey as a member state of NATO. On 18 February 1952, Turkey finally succeeded in
institutionalizing its relations with the West through membership in a permanent security alliance.

Turkey’s Involvement in the Middle East
The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic remained Europe-centric until the end of WWII.
However, after the Second World War, in 1947, Great Britain announced that it could no longer
sustain its responsibilities undertaken in treaties and could no longer prevent Russian expansion
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toward the south in the wake of the communist satellization of Eastern Europe, the communistinspired civil war in Greece and Soviet pressures for a naval base in the Turkish Straits. London
urged Washington to take over that responsibility or the danger of Soviet expansion was imminent
(Ucarol, 2008).
Between 1945 and 1975, the decolonization process of the European colonial empires gave
independence to 67 new states, 36 of which were in Africa. The freshly founded states became a
new front for strategic competition between the U.S.-led West, and the USSR-led East. The
decolonization process and the changing balance of power encouraged the Soviet Union to increase
its influence and pursue policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with an eye
to achieving several goals. First, while the USSR had consolidated its western border through the
occupation of satellite countries, its southern flank remained open. Second, because the British
and French were weakened by war and Italy was among the defeated states, an opportunity
appeared for the Soviet bloc to fill the power vacuum in southern Mediterranean region and former
colonies. Third, the USSR was contemplating expansion toward the Mediterranean region and
gaining a presence in the Atlantic. Finally, spreading ideology and securing economic benefits
were among Soviet objectives.
On the other hand, after the United States had taken over responsibility for the Middle East
from the United Kingdom through its new strategic policy of anti-Soviet containment, Washington
tried to shape both the European and Mediterranean region in a way that would prevent the
expansion of the Eastern Bloc. At the time, the U.S. was contemplating the construction of a
Middle East security structure associated with the NATO-led West in which newly independent
Israel would be integrated. However, because such a policy ran the risk of provoking immediate
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push-back from regional Arab states, Washington abandoned this strategy and focused on building
regional security organizations in which Israel would not actively participate.
Pursuant to the abovementioned policy and in order to consolidate the Middle East’s
security and prevent Soviet expansion in the region, on 24 February 1955, Turkey and Iraq
established the Bagdad Pact. The UK, Pakistan, and Iran joined the organization in the same year.
Thus, a new security bloc or so-called Green Belt was formed to prevent Soviet expansion in the
region. Although the Bagdad Pact and its immediate successor Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) did not perform well due to 1955 Iraqi coup that led this country to leave the proWestern bloc, the initiative became crucial to prove the commitment of Turkish foreign policy to
the Western community.
During this time, as a founding member of the pact, Turkey pursued an active policy of
enlisting Arab members, which antagonized Egypt and its allies. Interestingly, Turkey voted
against the Egypt-backed Algerian independence in 1956 in the U.N. General Assembly. A year
later, Turkey expressed strong resentments to Syria and threatened Damascus with the use of force
because Ankara perceived internal developments in that state as a Soviet plot. By 1958, Ankara
joined the so-called Peripheral Pact and permitted the U.S. to use its Incirlik airbase to intervene
in Lebanon.
Although Turkey became quite active in the Middle East region in the 1950s, it was only
involved in those regional arrangements proposed by the West and defined its national interest in
the context of the Cold War. In addition, Turkey was eager to prove itself useful to its allies. As a
result, Turkey engaged with the region as an extension of the Western security system, without
considering itself a part of the Middle East sub-region (Benli Altunisik, 2009)
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After the military coup in 1960, Turkish foreign policy became more withdrawn. Despite the brief
interruption during the 1974 Cyprus military intervention, Turkey’s Western orientation remained
unquestioned. This preferred policy orientation continued until the last years of the Cold War when
Turkey become aware of new opportunities to chart a more autonomous foreign policy.

Diminishing Security Concerns: Reconceptualized Activism
In 1980, Turkey shifted from an inward-oriented economic approach to a neoliberal market
structure. Turgut Ozal, the architect of the new economic system, applied a comprehensive
program aimed at promoting free markets and integrating the national economy into the world
system (Özdemir & Serin, 2016) This reform brought along with it a new foreign policy
perspective, one which required a substantial reformulation of Turkey’s relations with the
periphery. The change in industrial policy from one focused on import-substitution to one focused
on exports demanded the establishment of stable trade networks. Therefore, the structural change
in the Turkish economy encouraged Turkey to pay closer attention to regional affairs
(Karaosmanoglu,2000). However, Turkey’s attempts to develop new policy approaches did not
become observable until the 2000s; until then, in practice, Ankara continued to formulate its
relations with neighboring countries based mainly on security concerns.
The end of the Cold War was a milestone of change in Turkish foreign policy(Danforth,
2008; Onis, 2011). During the ’90s, Turkey abandoned its regional non-interference policy and
became involved in the First Gulf War. Ankara deployed a substantial number of troops along the
Iraqi border, opened airspace to U.S. aircraft, and provided support to the no-fly zone in northern
Iraq. Moreover, Turkey nearly initiated a conflict with Syria over its support of the PKK (Partiya
Karkeren Kurdistan; Kurdish Workers Party) and went to war with Greece over the Kardak islets.
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During the same decade, through emphasizing their cultural and historical similarities,
Turkey attempted to establish politico-economic ties with post-Soviet Central Asia, where many
Turkic republics emerged as independent states after the dissolution of USSR (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Likewise, to overcome the regional
economic compartmentalization caused by the Cold War, Turkey initiated the Black Sea Economic
and Cooperation Council in 1992 (Kirisci, 2009) At the end of the ’90s, Turkey’s interest in EU
membership increased.
The most important foreign policy decision-makers in the ’90s; Turgut Ozal, Suleyman
Demirel and Ismail Cem, believed that Turkey needed a multi-dimensional and engagement-based
policy orientation. For that reason, they continuously emphasized the need to make use of
Turkey’s cultural and historical identities, while criticizing the established rigid approach.
However, although the end of the Cold War bolstered Turkish willingness to engage with and mold
the surrounding environment, the country was significantly lacking in the capabilities to extract
benefits from these engagements (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016; Muftuler Bac, 2011; Oguzlu, 2008).
As a general tendency, even though some policies of the U.S. in the region were detrimental to
Turkey’s national interests, Turkey’s leaders engaged in activism in this period while being careful
not to detach their nation from the Western security framework (Ulgul, 2017).

The Era of Transition (1999-2008)
One of the most significant security issues that effect Turkey’s foreign policy is the
emergence of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan; Kurdish Worker Party). Abdullah Ocalan
established PKK in 1979, as a response to socio-economic backwardness in mostly Kurdish
populated areas, (where the majority of ethnic Kurds lived in villages under conditions similar to
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feudalism created by landed tribal leaders) and Turkey’s nationalistic ideology that centralized
"equal citizenship" around Turkishness (Tezcur, 2015).
Since the nation-building period after 1923, the existence of different ethnicities was seen
as a threat for long-desired homogeneous society. The possibility of Kurds to become a separate
political actor had been perceived as an element that can hinder the centralized unity and even
harm the territorial integrity of the state. In the 1980s to 2000s, as a continuation of this policy, the
Turkish state rejected the presence of any other ethnic group and associated the problems in these
regions with tribalism, reaction to secularism and modernity, and regional socio-economic
backwardness. This situation has increased the perception of political exclusion for Kurdish
identity (Yegen, 1996).
Primarily, Abdullah Ocalan aimed a change inside the Kurdish society and initiated armed
struggle in 1979 against the powerful landlords, which he believed were the real suppressors of
the Kurds (Tezcur 2015). Later, the PKK has initiated armed conflict against the Turkish state
since 1983. Because the geographical areas where the PKK initially confronted the landlords was
not favorable to conduct guerilla warfare against the Turkish military, it relocated its forces to the
mountainous Iraqi border region, where the state authority was historically weak.
Also, border regions were suitable for PKK to receive backing from its external branch
members located in the neighboring countries as well as from the adjacent states’ administrations.
For example, because of the water problems and territorial disputes with Turkey, the Syrian
government considered the existence of PKK as leverage against its northern neighbor (Tejel,
2008). After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, Syria offered refuge to the PKK leadership as
part of a balancing strategy against Turkey (Schott, 2017). Syria allowed the PKK to open political
offices in many cities, which turned the PKK into the only Kurdish political movement that can
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operate in the country without interruption. Moreover, the First Gulf War and the power vacuum
left by Saddam provided the PKK with an opportunity to use Iraq as a sanctuary, where from it
can organize attacks against Turkey.
At the end of the ‘90s, Turkey began to feel some destabilizing effects from U.S. policies,
especially America’s policy in Iraq. The no-fly zone and the subsequent central government’s
decreased control provided the PKK with a safe haven. That situation became the harbinger for
the future dissatisfaction of Turkey against the U.S. methods in the region. For example, on 24
January 1999, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, a social democrat, requested a dialog with the U.S.to
clarify some uncertain policies regarding Iraq. Ecevit expressed his concerns about the risk of
regional war, stating that the U.S. policies toward Iraq were his primary concern (Aydin, Erhan,
& Erdem, 2001).
In 2002, the newly elected Justice and Development Party (JDP) government followed a
multi-dimensional and active foreign policy similar to that of Ozal and Cem. Turkey initiated
unprecedented engagements with its neighbors as well as previously neglected regions such as
Africa and Latin America. Similarly, Ankara prioritized the negotiation process for obtaining full
membership in the EU and boosted relations with the Central Asian states. Turkey has enlarged
the amount of provided foreign aid, increased its presence in peace-keeping operations, become
more visible in international organizations, increased foreign missions by opening new embassies,
and established direct air travel to many new destinations (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016).
One of the most prominent examples used as evidence of Turkey’s divergence from the
West occurred during this period, when the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) refused
to grant permission to the U.S. forces from Turkish soil against Iraq in March 2003 Second Gulf
War. Although this event was a significant blow to U.S.-Turkey relations, Europeans shared an
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anti-war view similar to that of Turkey, suggesting this incident is not in fact clear evidence of
Turkey’s departure from the West (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016) Still, actions such as accepting
Hamas officials in Ankara in 2006, an event received by the U.S. with caution, raised eyebrows
about Turkish activism in the region.

The Era of Intense Criticism (After 2009)
The real discussion about the shift in Turkish foreign policy emerged after 2009, when
Turkey ceased diplomatic relations with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident, voted in the UN
against sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program, continued relations with Sudanese president Omar
Al-Bashir, and improved its relations with China and Russia, while decreasing its interest towards
the EU.
This transformation in Turkish foreign policy started the “axis shift” arguments, which
created an extensive literature about the orientation, goals, and causes of the observed change.
Despite the debate, initially, Turkey continued to cooperate with the U.S. In 2009, Barack Obama
made his first overseas presidential visit to Turkey, to emphasize its role as a model country that
could successfully accommodate liberal markets, Islam and democracy. At the time, the U.S.
viewed Turkey as a perfect model of the sorts of democratic governments that it was hoped would
replace the authoritarian administrations of the Middle East after the Arab Spring (Ulgul, 2017).
However, the U.S. administration abandonment of the moderate Islam project (Hamid,
Mandaville, & Mccants, 2017) , bad relations with Israel and the policy conflict in Syria worsened
the relations to a historic low. The U.S. lost interest in the Syrian civil war and prioritized the fight
against ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). Consequently, Washington stopped its contribution
to the opposition and started to support the YPG (YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel; People
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Protection Unit), which was the Syrian branch of the PKK, as local partners in the fight against
ISIS. Moreover, on 19 October 2014, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition dropped small arms and
ammunition as well as other provisions to YPG elements. In June 2015, the YPG captured the
border town Tel Abyad from ISIS with the help of the U.S. led-coalition. Turkey vocally criticized
this development that allowed the PKK's sister organization to control over 250 kilometers of the
Turkish-Syrian border. At the end of January 2016, U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for the fight
against ISIS, Brett McGurk, visited northern Syria and posed together with PYD militias, which
caused an uproar in Turkey.
Subsequently, after harshly criticizing Washington, Turkey began to openly oppose the
U.S. policies and objectives in the region by actively projecting force and organizing diplomatic
initiatives. On 24 August 2016, Turkey launched operation "Euphrates Shield" against ISIS and
PKK-related Kurdish PYD militias (Kanat, Diptas, & Hennon, 2017). On 24 April 2017, Turkish
warplanes conducted raids against PKK/PYD positions in Iraq and Syria; some of these raids took
place just 10 miles away from U.S. forces. On 13 December 2017, Turkey called Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (ICO) members in Istanbul to condemn Donald Trump’s decision to
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. On 29 December 2018, Ankara finalized a contract
with Moscow for the acquisition of the Russian S-400 air-defense system. Turkey moved ahead
with the contract despite the strident opposition of NATO and the threat of the U.S. to cancel the
sale of F-35 jet fighters. On 20 January 2018, Turkey initiated “Operation Olive Branch” to curb
the PYD/YPG control in Afrin city, a move that put U.S. policymakers between a rock and a hard
place (Cavusoglu, 2018)
Further deviating from U.S. policy preferences, Turkey has begun to participate in
diplomatic initiatives organized by Russia. Ankara refused to abide by the unilateral sanctions
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imposed by the U.S. after unilateral withdrawal decision from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action). Moreover, Turkey was one of the leading states to lobby against the U.S. decision
to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
A vigorous discussion has emerged about the Turkish foreign policy (TFP) transition which
saw Turkish policy evolving from complete submission to open opposition against its traditional
allies, especially since 2009. A concise review of Ankara’s general foreign policy evolution hints
at a persistent trend towards displaying more agency in international relations. The following
chapter discusses a variety of views in the literature regarding the change in TFP.

Conclusion
This Chapter has attempted to recapture the motives behind Turkey's Western proclivity.
During the first years of the fledgling republic, improving relations with the major Western states
was unavoidable because of the preferred path for development and security reasons. Later, the
devastating effects of WWII and the subsequent Soviet threat raised Turkey's security risk
perception and bolstered its willingness to establish stronger ties with the U.S. led West.
Through the Cold War, Turkey clung to the West and acted as an extended arm of the
alliance framework. Ankara defined its national interests in parallel with the West and attempted
to prove itself useful to its allies.
However, when the security threats have diminished, and Turkey transformed into a new
economic model that has required an outward looking for development, regardless of which
spectrum they belong to, Turkish elites attempted to reformulate foreign policy approach. They
developed a multi-dimensional and engagement-oriented foreign policy rhetoric but hardly
realized any of its objectives.
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At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey's behavior has changed
dramatically. Ankara has diverged from the traditional policy and took a more confrontational
stance. Currently, Turkey has many problems especially with the U.S., which produced myriad
arguments about the cause for the transition.
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CHAPTER TWO:
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction
This chapter will explore different explanation regarding the change in Turkish foreign
policy by examine the main arguments and the core of their assumptions. It aims at discovering
viable interpretations of the phenomenon and define the gap in the literature.
The literature regarding the substantial change in Turkish foreign policy preferences since
the end of the Cold War has received great deal of attention, especially in the last decade. Nearly
all of the studies agree that Turkey has become a more assertive actor and its activism has
dramatically increased around its surroundings. There is a consensus that Turkey has exhibited a
propensity to act more independently, which contributes to a belief that there has been a “shift of
axis” or departure from Western orientation. Many argue that the shift stems from ideational
reasons, while some stress the weight of material factors. Analyses which are focused on Turkey’s
domestic dynamics dominate the scholarly opinions, outnumbering systemic approaches.
The literature which explains interstate relations and changes in foreign policies usually
categorizes the competing theories according to their “level of analysis.” Since the descriptions
about the TFP transformation are dispersed, and the arguments usually do not follow a specific
approach, this study will classify them according to the Waltz's "level of analysis" approach, which
entails three levels. The first level, the “systemic” (international) analysis, focuses on the place of
the actors in the international system and posits that the structure exogenously determines the
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behaviors of the states. He classifies as second level explanations those based on “domestic”
factors of nation-states, such as culture, society, and institutions. This category includes theories
which claim that states do not merely respond to the structure but consciously built it. Finally, in
the individual-level classifications, he takes the personal attributes of individual statesmen as the
unit of analysis (Evans, Jacobson, & Putnam, 1993; Singer, 2006; Waltz, 1969).

Domestic Level (State Structure) Analyses
For the most part, scholarly studies have chosen domestic level analyses to explain the
change that has occurred in TFP. Among the proponents of this method, some scholars have
affiliated the new policy preferences with the shift of social dynamics and subsequent change in
political power from secular elites to conservative parties, while others contend that the change
has occurred within the neo-Ottoman concept.
The champions of the social change argument claim that, since the Ozal Administration2,
ruling political leaders have continuously emphasized the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the
Islamic identity of the nation. This change in the perception of history reversed the nation-building
ideology of the founders, who not only rejected the Imperial background and Islam as the essential
elements of society but staunchly favored Western values and structures (Altunisik & Tur, 2004;
Altunisik & Tur, 2004; Benli Altunisik, 2009; Pipes, 1993; Yanık, 2011). Similarly, Muftuler and
Bac believe that the change in the power balance among internal actors with unlike worldviews is
vital to understanding the transformation of Turkish foreign policy (Muftuler Bac, 2011)
Fuller argues that the rising social and economic power of the conservative Anatolian
business class, most of whom backed Justice and Development Party (JDP) and identified

2

Turgut Ozal was Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and President between 1989-1993.
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themselves as the progeny of the Ottoman Empire, has accelerated this tendency. He asserts that
their domination over the Western-centric elites facilitated the establishment of a connection with
Turkey’s historical past and its religious tradition (Fuller, 2008; Kirisci, 2009; Tezcur &
Grigorescu, 2014).
On the other hand, institutional explanations focus on Turkey’s relations with European
allies. They claim that despite Turkey’s genuine desire to be a full member, EU unwillingness to
accommodate a country with a different culture and identity has severely changed public opinion
and created a nationalistic backlash. Obstacles to becoming a full member state of Europe forced
Turkey to look for other geopolitical alternatives (Başer, 2015; Kirişci, 2012; Onis, 2011).
Similarly, Taspinar considers the change to be the result of Turkey’s growing self-confidence visà-vis the West and its disappointment with the Transatlantic bloc (Taspinar, 2011).
The proponents of neo-Ottomanism as the explanation for the change in Turkish foreign
policy have produced copious arguments to explain why Turkey has distanced itself from the West.
One can observe that the popularity of this concept increased in two distinctive periods. It appeared
in the literature for the first time when Turkey increased its interactions with Central Asian states
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The breakdown of the USSR and Russia’s relative
weakness at the time created a power vacuum in the Balkans and Central Asia. Turkey’s desire to
develop ties based on ethnic and cultural similarities was widely interpreted as an attempt to
resurrect the Ottoman Empire (Constantinides, 1996; Erşen, 2013; Taspinar, 2008; Walker, 2009;
Yavuz, 1998).
Fuller describes this first version of neo-Ottomanism as a development of Turkey-centric
view, in which it stays in the middle of the reemerging world “rather than at the tail-end of a
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European world” with “ a renewed interest in the former territories and people of the
Empire.”(Fuller, 1992)
The second version surfaced with Ahmet Davutoglu’s3 “Strategic Depth” concept.
Although officials refrained from using the term, this new idea of neo-Ottomanism was based on
a belief that the Ottoman past is not only an advantage in the conduct of foreign policy but also
places responsibility on Turkey to get involved in regional problems(Benli Altunışık, 2009;
Murinson, 2006). The advocates of this version argue that Turkish foreign policy is closely related
to national identity, that a newly emerged adherence to an Ottoman-Islamic narrative has
influenced the preferences of the state (Yavuz, 1998). In some views, recalling the Ottoman
multinational legacy allows Turkey to embrace the Kurdish population and reconfigure the
definition of “citizenship” as less ethnic and more multinational. This relaxed version of
“citizenship” emphasizes Islam as a common denominator between Kurds and Turks, and in turn
facilitates the finding of commonalities in the Middle East. Taspinar argues that if neo-Ottoman
visionaries can embrace such controversial domestic issues, they may also have a serious impact
on the international level (Taspinar, 2008).
For others, Neo-Ottomanism principally tries to utilize the cosmopolitanism of the
Ottoman legacy to exert influence on populations from differing cultures (Meral & Paris, 2010).
As such, many believe that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) endeavors to utilize
multiculturalism in relations with the states around its periphery by embracing the Islamic world
outside the West(Gullo, 2012). Thus, while the first version of neo-Ottomanism was based on
attempts to reconcile Turkey’s Eastern and Western identity as an asset, the second version

3

Ahmet Davutoglu is a prolific scholar and prominent figure in Turkish politics. He became a political adviser to
Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayip Erdogan in 2003. During his service he was dubbed the shadow
foreign affairs minister. In 2009, he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Between 2014 and 2016 he held the office
of Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.
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emphasizes an Islamic identity, which is in harmony with democracy and the West (Benli
Altunışık, 2009; Gullo, 2012).
Furthermore, some assert that the shift is caused by a hybridization of geography and
history, which helped Turkish elites to formulate an indigenous self-image as an “exceptional”
nation. The central geographical position in-between the civilizations and the multicultural legacy
of the Ottoman Empire has empowered Turkish policymakers to position themselves not only as
mediators or peace brokers, but also to define the future role of the country as a “rising
power”(Yanık, 2011)
Nonetheless, many argue that the current “change” argument may not be a new
phenomenon since the social and historical context proves continuity in the evolving trend. They
hint that affiliating the transition of the TFP to the ideological orientation of JDP prevents
considering the observable facts(Benli Altunisik, 2009; Dietrich Jung, 2011; Hatipoglu & Palmer,
2016; Ulgul, 2017). Danforth analyzes policies from the foundation years to the Erdogan period
and stresses that pragmatism, not ideology, shapes Turkish preferences (Danforth, 2008).

Individual Level (Characteristics of Individual) Analyses
Proponents of analysis at the level of the individual emphasize the influence of several
political leaders on Turkish foreign policy. Their arguments focus on leaders who diverged from
traditional West-oriented policies and propagated a new national identity that meshed with the
multiculturalism of the Ottoman past and Islam. Advocates of this approach point to the powerful
influence of Turgut Ozal, Abdullah Gul, Ahmet Davutoglu and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who have
Islamic backgrounds. They believe that the conservative ideology of these leaders has led to their
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enacting active policies in the former Ottoman space and produced an adversarial stance with the
West.
Furthermore, the new course of Turkish foreign policy has been attributed to the rise of
Islamism in the country and its popularity in the region. According to the supporters of this view,
since the founders of JDP (Justice and Development Party) are well known members of political
Islam, which naturally has some anti-Western sentiments in its character, it should not be
surprising to observe a substantial shift of axis (Çınar, 2011; Eligür, 2010; Heper, 2013; Sambur,
2009).
Recently, most of the critics are attributed to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is ruling Turkey
since 2002. Some assert that President Erdogan’s complete control over the Turkish state limited
the U.S. influence to decision making through previously practiced strong institutional ties.
Therefore, the decrease of institutional share in the decision making resulted in more centralized
state structure which prioritizes the President's worldview and domestic political imperatives
(Hoffman, Makovsky, & Werz, 2018).
Stein adds that the unpopularity of Western organizations such as NATO and EU among
the Turkish nationalistic population has incentivized Mr. Erdogan to use anti-Western and
confrontational policies against U.S. and EU as a source of consolidating domestic support for his
policies. In this view, Turkish politicians are accused of using foreign policy as an instrument for
populist political gain (Stein, 2018).

International Level (State System) Analyses
Interestingly, the systemic level analysis regarding the changes in Turkish foreign policy
has received little attention, leading to a significant gap in the literature. Although some scholars

23

attribute Turkey’s changing preferences to the nation’s increased material capabilities, their
analyses remain limited to correlating the rise of GDP with the emerging behavioral pattern.
For instance, Kirisci argues that the growing export-oriented industries have encouraged
leaders to develop stronger relations with potential markets in the Middle East, Central Asia and
Africa (Kirisci, 2009). Similarly, Tezcur and Grigorescu assert that after the end of the Cold War,
emboldened by its increase in GDP, Turkey adopted a more independent position and assertive
foreign policy (Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014). Some parallel views emphasize the increasing GDP
as the indicator of growing Turkish national power, which grants Turkey capabilities to conduct
more independent policies (Hatipoglu & Palmer, 2016).
Bac believes that the major international transition of the end of the Cold War challenged
the traditional paradigm of Turkish foreign policy and revealed alternative perspectives. Also, the
collapse of the USSR eased pressure on Turkey and provided an opportunity to influence
surrounding places, which led to redefining the historical/cultural dimension in Turkish foreign
policy. Thus, she claims, the transition in the international systemic structure provided a context
for re-thinking Turkish foreign policy(Muftuler Bac, 2011).
On the other hand, Aslan eloquently delineates a generic mechanism between material
capacity and ideological factors and their effects on asserting agency in International Relations
(IR). He assumes that accompanied by increasing material capabilities, Turkey seeks autonomy
and active agency in the system. Thus, the country’s recent preferences prioritize national interest
at the expense of being perceived as a faithful follower of West (Inat, Aslan, & Duran, 2017)
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Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the ongoing scholarly discussion about the causes of the changed
Turkish foreign policy. It has deployed the level of analysis approach to categorize the standpoint
of the authors meaningfully. Since the study favors a system level interpretation, doing so has
provided a clear map beneficial to reveal the gap in the literature. Also, it has helped to eliminate
the works that randomly aggregated arguments to extract some meaning.
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CHAPTER THREE:
EFFECTS OF A UNIPOLAR SYSTEMIC STRUCTURE ON REGIONAL STATES

Introduction
This chapter will focus on explaining the systemic effects of unipolar international
structure on the behavior of regional states and link the findings with the observable aspects of
Turkish foreign policy. In the first section, it will provide arguments that justify the purpose of the
work. The next part will twist the structural realist approaches to conceptualize a regionally
relevant testable theory for the Middle East. Finally, the chapter will lay out a mechanism that
describes how the effects of systemic change incentivize Turkey to take an independent position
and test the assertions.

The Research Question and Justification of the Study
This study attempts to find an answer to the question “Why have Turkey’s foreign policy
preferences changed?” The existing literature provides an extensive account of relevant sociopolitical events that successfully elaborates the observed reality based on domestic dynamics.
However, even though most of the studies aim at explaining the “why” question, they frequently
end up either with extremely reductionist answers or with responses that describe not “why” but
“how” the change has occurred.
First, the existing literature accepts the end of the Cold War as an influential factor, but
almost all studies treat it as a given fact. Despite the well-known reality that Turkey could never
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escape from international turbulence and geographical shifts of power, the scholarly attention to
the structural changes and their effect on the country’s political preferences has received
inadequate consideration. While many studies take the collapse of USSR as a starting point in
describing the observed Turkish activism, they quickly delve into a more popular discussion of the
ideational disposition of governing elites. Thus, many scholars concentrate their attention on the
ideational dissimilarities of current elites with those of previous decision makers and base their
findings on these differences.
Second, the majority of proponents of unit level explanations acknowledge Turkey’s desire
for autonomy, influence and responsibility in the region without succeeding in explaining, or even
attempting to explain, why Turkey felt this desire. First of all, the elites who are at the center of
the discussion and draw most of the criticism and bear most of the responsibility for policy changes
have not created a new concept or set of objectives different from their predecessors. For example,
Turgut Ozal (Prime Minister, 1983-1989; President, 1989-1993), a statesman with strong ties to
the Islamic community, had a powerful desire to change Turkish foreign policy and depart from
the established views by searching out alternative options. He was the first politician to introduce
the Ottoman cosmopolite past and Turkish dual identity as an asset, and he advocated pursuit of a
more active policy in Central Asia and the Middle East. However, during his tenure, he was a
steadfast advocate of acting together with the U.S.(Benli Altunışık, 2009)
Likewise, Ismail Cem, a prominent center-left Turkish foreign affairs minister who served
between 1997-2002, contemplated a conceptual renewal of Turkish foreign policy based on
Turkey’s dual identity. He was known as a statesman who accentuated the importance of pursuing
active and assertive policies (Benli Altunisik, 2009) In his book, Cem defines his policy objectives
as utilizing the cultural and historical assets in the region by highlighting Turkey’s multi-
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civilizational identity, exploiting Turkey’s potential as a role model in the region, and solving
problems with Turkey’s neighbors, especially in the Middle East (Cem, 2001).
The similarities of the foreign policy objectives (re-defining multicultural identity,
reducing problems with neighbors, and adopting an active approach) of the ruling JDP, which
represents the conservative right, and the center-leftist parties, which delegated foreign affairs to
Ismail Cem, are striking. These similarities across political parties lead one to ask how the
ideological affiliations of the actors can be presented as a dependable source for the perceived
change in the Turkish behavior pattern, and if we can expect to see Turkish foreign policy revert
to its West-centric character after the current political leadership hands over power to elites with a
different worldview.
Third, there is considerable evidence that contradicts the theory that the current
government’s Islamic tendencies and its affiliation with political Islam is a source for the observed
changes in Turkey’s foreign policies. The proponents of this view believe that souring relations
with Israel, open opposition to U.S. policies, increased engagement with anti-American Iran,
Hamas and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, are evidence that Turkey’s foreign policy is ideologically
motivated. However, ideology can hardly explain why Turkey has moved to improve relations
with ideologically irrelevant Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, Brazil, Turkey’s historical
enemy Russia or the Chinese Communist Party which actively excludes and suppresses the Islamic
identity of the Uyghurs’ of Xinjiang province. If relations with these parties are merely motivated
by anti-Americanism, then how to explain Turkish-U.S. cooperation in endorsing the
democratization agenda in the Middle East during the Arab Spring? The JDP, since 2002, has
proven numerous times that it is, in fact, one of the most pragmatic governments the Turkish
Republic has ever had.
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Unit level analysis significantly fails to explain Turkey’s relations with its regional rival
Iran. Both countries are champions of rival religious camps that cannot compromise their spiritual
values. Both countries frequently blame each other’s policies for the sectarianism in the Middle
East. Turkey cautioned Iran against the use of Shia Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq,
while Tehran blamed Ankara’s support of the opposition in Syria, which mostly consisted of
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, for the strife in that country. Seeing as re-imposed sanctions
had the potential to seriously limit Tehran’s political and economic influence in the region, why
did Turkey resist U.S. sanctions policies which aimed to isolate Iran?
Finally, one can observe that the neo-Ottomanist explanations heavily emphasize historical
aspects while underestimating the importance of security and economic perspectives.
Significantly, these explanations fail to consider the inadequate material capability of the current
Turkish state to invigorate such an imperial structure. Although the evidence indicates that Turkey
prefers soft power and trade as a proper instrument to increase influence and extract benefits from
the region, these views imply hegemonic intentions, which openly disregard the material capability
gap of Turkey. For example, the proponents of this approach argue that the Turkish incursion in
Syria is aimed at annexing the territories once believed to be part of the nation while disregarding
the role of massive security threats and the already devastating spillover effects to Turkey in
inspiring the interventions.
While admitting that the contributions of existing studies have some value, in the light of
the literature review, this study assumes that the explanations of the phenomenon remain
parsimonious and fail to provide a comprehensive mechanism which can meaningfully delineate
the current and future evolution of Turkish policy preferences. The central fallacy of the current
analyses is their tendency to interpret certain events and actors, which are only the “means” to
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achieve certain “ends”, as the primary source for explaining Turkish foreign policy. The existing
literature is deeply involved in unit level studies, and they tend to link the observed foreign policy
behavior with the “instruments” of conducting politics rather than with the “objectives” of a state,
which has an inherent desire to develop economically in a very advantageous but volatile
geography. Therefore, this study aims to provide an alternative explanation, a sound systemic
analysis, which can define the external pressures on Turkey and correctly position the domestic
explanations in an appropriate context.

The Concept of the Study
Turkey Takes an Independent Position
This work claims that the perceived change in the TFP is mainly structural. Since the end
of the Cold War, the global international systemic structure has shifted from bipolar to unipolar.
This new structure lacks the threat of the USSR and has incentivized Turkey to reshape its
traditional alliance relations. The diminished risk perception and the actual entrapment in poorly
calculated American interventionist regional policies, which have turned out to be detrimental to
Turkish national interests, pushed Ankara to pursue more “independent” policies.
In contrast with the Cold War, a policy of outsourcing the nation’s security needs by closely
adhering to one great power and its alliance system is now unproductive for Turkey. Indeed, the
U.S. no longer being checked by another peer power, it is now U.S. policies that have become the
primary destabilizer of the region. Realizing that it cannot completely rely on the U.S. to
materialize its national objectives, Turkey has preferred to reduce its dependence on the U.S. and
(with the help of increased material capabilities) has adopted a self-help approach.
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The preference of pursuing autonomous policies has transformed Turkey from a peripheral
country in an alliance system into a central state which has to conduct its own affairs actively.
Therefore, in order to fill the vacuum that has occurred as a result of rejecting a predominant state’s
policy preferences, Turkey has become an active regional actor whose policies sometimes have
contradicted those of the unipole.

The Scope and Assumptions
The thesis of the study assumes that the change in TFP is structural. It posits that the shift
from a bipolar to a unipolar international system and the state’s growing national power has
incentivized Turkey to deploy a self-help approach that requires a high level of political and
security activity to replace previous arrangements.
To prove the claim, this chapter will conceptualize a regionally relevant testable structural
theory for the Middle East, which can be utilized to describe the behavior patterns of local states
as well as Turkey. It will lay out a mechanism that describes how the effects of systemic change
incentivize Turkey to take an independent position. Later, in Chapter 4, the work will focus on
explaining the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy. That part of the study claims that the
shift in TFP is the outcome of attempting to materialize national objectives through independent
policy choice. Also, it will empirically test whether the claim of the thesis is correct.
Since it is a structural analysis, the work focuses on system-unit interactions. It also
assumes that the current structure of international relations is unipolar. Therefore, the study accepts
Turkish-American engagements as the most lucrative area to investigate, because the U.S.
preferences represent the system itself. Moreover, nearly all bilateral interactions are linked to or
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take place in the Middle East. For that reason, the analyzed incidents are limited to the Middle East
and the period from 1990 to 2019.

Systemic Effects of a Unipolar International Structure on Regional States
The study values the explanatory capacity of the structural realist theories. Yet, since these
theories mainly focus on major powers and are narrow in their formulations, this work creates a
tweaked version of a Structural Realist approach suitable to apply at the regional level. Mainly to
do so, the study reformulates some concepts to close the gap between the theory and the observable
facts.
First, both “defensive” and “offensive” realists have a very narrow definition of power, one
which focuses primarily on military might and economy. To avoid being restricted in measuring
the actors’ actual national power and their relative positions in the international system, the study
redefines power and deploys the DIME4 (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic)
method.
Second, Structural Realists always describe the nature of the international system as
fundamentally anarchic. This definition may be relevant in the Balance of Power School when the
structure of the international system is either multipolar (“offensive” Realists) or bipolar as in the
Cold War system (“defensive” Realist). However, all measurable facts indicate that--even though
it is eroding--the structure of the international system is still unipolar5. As the Power
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DIME is a method, which is extensively used by policy planners in the military, to evaluate the national power of
the actors of interest.
5
The problem of polarity after the Cold War has hardly reached a consensus. The USSR implosion unequivocally
brought the bipolarity to the end. However, the debate whether the supremacy of the U.S. could create a substantial
unipolar system produced different explanations. Some argued that the unipolar moment would inevitably followed
by multipolarity (Kegley and Raymond 1994; Waltz 2002; Kupchan 1998; Calleo 1999). Others such as Samuel
Huntington’s idea of “uni-multipolarity” tried to come up with some mixed versions (Huntington, 1999). Some
favored a resistant and stable unipolarity around the U.S. predominance (Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999; Walt 2009;
Wohlforth 1999). Similar to Buzan et al, this study believes that the definition of polarity is strongly dependent on the
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Preponderance School posits, in a system where the distribution of power lies in the hands of a
single state, the nature of the international structure is expected to be hierarchic. Therefore, in order
to be consistent with observable facts, this work reconciles the Balance of Power (BOP) school’s
anarchical definition with the Power Preponderance (PP) school’s hierarchical order. In other
words, the study extends structural realist theory’s explanatory power into the unipolar systemic
order by redefining the nature of the international system at regional level.
Third, employing DIME analysis, the work evaluates the position of the Middle Eastern
states in the regional structural spectrum and aims to provide a meaningful behavioral pattern that
describes how regional states act under the systemic pressure of a unipolar international order.
Finally, it checks the validity of the theory.

Power Redefined
The purpose of seeking a comprehensive definition of the concept of power is to take a
realistic snapshot of the current Middle East regional security system structure and evaluate the
regional states’ positions in this system.
The Realist’s approach to defining the concept of “power” is holistic and mainly focused
on military and/or economic dimensions. However, these definitions are very simplistic and have
a limited ability to accurately describe reality.
The academic debate about the definition of power is extensive. Some argue that states’
material capacity (military or economy) remains always of primary concern. However, others also
give primacy to non-material domestic factors such as national identity, practical procedures,

concept of “great power.” At the moment, despite the high prospect of China, the current major powers have various
defections to become full-fledged great powers (Buzan & Waever, 2010). Also, in the Middle East context, China
avoids exerting agency against the U.S. regional policy preferences while Moscow display eagerness to challenge
Washington but lacks significant capability.
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ideologies that help to mobilize power in a specific direction, and strong leadership. Apart from
the theoretical debates, the observable facts indicate that both material capacity and non-material
factors are essential to generate “power” that can serve to advance the national interests of states.
Therefore, to adequately define the power of the states, which is essential for evaluating their
behavior, this section will operationalize the concept of power.
While there are many accepted “elements for national power,” this paper will neglect the
static components like geography or historical complexities and will focus on the dynamic

Figure 1: Elements of National Power

elements, namely Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy (DIME)(Farlin, 2014). In this
analysis, “D” (Diplomacy) is accepted as a method that nations use to convince other actors to act
in favor of their national interests. It entails the ability of a state to have access in influential
International Organizations (IO), aptitude for communicating with important actors of occurring
conflicts, potential to initiate or actively navigate a bargain, peace talks or agreement, and the
ability to create relationships with states of interest.
“I” (Information) as an instrument of national power refers to the ways a state uses
information to shape the environment in which the realization of interest will take place. While the
narrow definition of “information” is frequently associated with the intelligence that is essential to
grasping the international environment, in the DIME method “information” refers more broadly to
the strategic communication of objectives and the presentation of a nation’s interests in the most
persuasive manner. Thus, the informational domain describes the ability to create a favorable
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environment for the national interest and reduce the opposition to the nation’s policy preferences.
In the regional context, information as an element of national power, the ability to present a
message that will be accepted by the other states is significant. A state’s ability to successfully
present itself as a protector of a religion, a supporter of special minority groups, a benevolent actor
toward neighbors, or an admired model country, or to convince other states that its military
interventions are necessary actions, are good examples.
The “M” (Military) element of national power embodies the actual armed components or
the military might of a nation. A credible threat to use a well configured hard power often provides
options to policy- and decision-makers that can help them achieve national interests. Yet, due to
the high cost of military action and the unpredictability of the outcomes of military conflict it is an
element of the last resort.
The configuration and the source of military power have a direct effect on the behavior of
the Middle Eastern states. States which perceive regional rivalries or major power threats have a
motivation to configure a military with relevant capabilities. The criteria used to distinguish if a
regional military power should be considered capable and modern include its ability to project
power within the immediate neighborhood and the technological level of its domestic arms
production. As mentioned before, in the regional perspective there are limits to the accumulation
of power, and limits also apply to the development of military capacity.
Recent regional conflicts prove that modern warfare occurs in areas where air superiority
is not contested. Since the U.S. and recently Russia have demonstrated the power to deny air space
to any other actor, conflicts in the region are fought against proxy groups and with the coordinated
consent of the major powers. Thus, nations with the capabilities to produce and use precisionguided ammunition, advanced surveillance systems, modern fire support configurations, and
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armed drones gain a significant advantage—the ability to export a disagreement into a neighboring
state, because of the lower cost of conducting a military operation. On the other hand, due to the
widespread application of arms embargos and selective arms sales in the Middle East, states that
outsource these abilities and must import military equipment frequently face obstacles in the
pursuit of their national interests. For example, due to humanitarian concerns over Yemen and
Saudi government officials’ involvement in the murder of an opposing journalist, the U.S. banned
sales of precision-guided ammunition to Saudi Arabia and stopped fueling the operations of the
Saudi-led Arab Coalition, which significantly stalled its operations.
“E” (economy), the economic instrument of national power is the primary enabler of other
dimensions of the DIME. Therefore, it is not only related to the issues of national economic
resilience, but also with the way of organizing it as a tool of influence abroad. Many of the regional
regimes lack popular support, and their hold on power is hardly legitimate. As such, while resorting
to authoritarian measures helps to control the populations, inefficiency in economic development
can be extremely dangerous--in many states, the ability to provide benefits to the populations
replaces popular support as a source of legitimacy. Therefore, regional states assiduously take into
account any possible economic losses or gains when formulating policies. This domain includes a
wide range of elements like a nation’s GDP, trade, foreign investment, economic assistance,
financial position, and trading arrangements.
This study uses the DIME method to create a valid evaluation of the Middle Eastern states’
national power in the current regional system.
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Rethinking the ME Regional Order under the Dynamics of the Unipolar System
The theories of International Relations (IR) are more concerned with the global level and
major powers, so they tend to neglect specific features of the regions and their actors. Since there
is a lack of relevant structural theory applicable to the Middle East region, it is not surprising to
observe that many scholars refrain from adopting comprehensive explanations based on systemlevel analyses. This study tweaks the structural approaches to devise an eloquent mechanism in
accordance with the observed facts in the Middle East.
This part of the paper argues that at the regional level the system of international relations
encompasses both anarchical and hierarchical features. It explains why the unipolar structure
incentivizes some regional countries to pursue autonomy or adopt a self-help system. Finally, it
presents an analysis of regional states that can prove the validity of the theory and its ability to
explain the behavior of Turkey.
Realism as International Relation theory attempt to delineate the nature of the international
system, define the concept of power, determine the dominant state behavior, and describe whether
state preferences are exogenous or domestically driven. However, both the most preeminent
Balance of Power (BOPw) and Power Preponderance (PP) theories are exclusively focused on the
global level, and they look at the world from a great power point of view.
The Balance of Power (BOPw) school assumes that the nature of the international system
is anarchic and that all states rely on their own capabilities to ensure national survival. Therefore,
the sovereign nations in the international system are all self-help actors and the relations between
the states are extremely competitive (Morgenthau, 1961). In addition, the proponents of BOPw
argue that “balancing” is the dominant state behavior. While admitting that the nature of the
international system is anarchic, in contrast with Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer emphasize
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that it is not human nature but the international structure that is the decisive element in guiding
state preferences. Accordingly, it is military capability that defines the concept of power
(Mearsheimer, 2007; Waltz, 1982). On the other hand, Power Preponderance (PP) advocates argue
that the nature of the international system is hierarchic; the dominant state behavior is”
bandwagoning” while the size of the economy (GDP) best defines the concept of power (Organski
& Kugler, 1980)
However, the visible evidence in the Middle East refutes both schools’ expectations and
reveals their explanatory capacities to be rudimentary to explain regional dynamics in the PostCold War. Since 1991, the U.S. is the unchallenged superpower in the region regarding all
dimension of power (G. John Ikenberry et al., 2009; William C. Wohlforth, 1999). Yet, the regional
states’ behavior cannot be categorized flatly as bandwagoning or as balancing. In the region, while
some countries continue to follow loyally the traditional U.S. hierarchy system (and
bandwagoning), some states have recently adopted a self-help system and act autonomously or
independently from the security preferences of the unipole superpower. Therefore, in the Middle
Eastern regional systemic level, the nature of international relations has characteristics of both
anarchy and hierarchy.
While in any international system the only fundamental security threat to a major power is
another major power or an alliance of hostile states, at the regional level, Middle Eastern countries
face multiple threats. They must deal with security threats stemming from global actors and
regional rivals, as well as with internal instabilities which are triggered by the spillover effects of
local conflicts, ethnosectarian rifts or social resentments. Besides, as much as security, economic
development remains a top priority for all regional states. Failure in achieving a certain level of
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economic prosperity has significant potential to weaken the stability of a state and the already
dubious legitimacy of its regime.
Thus, the hierarchical nature of the region derives from the ongoing necessity to balance
national and regional security risks vs. economic development. Bilgel argues that--in contrast to
the great powers--the states in the Middle East have goals other than simply achieving security,
goals like internal development. Therefore, most of them need to trade off their autonomy and
depend on a benevolent great power to whom they outsource their security needs in order to
concentrate on other essential objectives (Bilgel, 2014). Also, the lack of capabilities to cope with
regional rivalries or internal threats makes weak states dependent on a security provider. Moreover,
many governments have limited domestic or international legitimacy due to their inclination
toward authoritarianism, non-democratic applications, and dire human rights history. Therefore,
accepting the U.S. preponderance with a hierarchical bond is one of the guaranteed ways to avoid
fierce American (unipole) criticism/intervention and ensure internal and external acceptability.
On the other hand, after the Soviet threat of the Cold War era dissipated, the unchecked
American activism in the ME has created various stability problems. The lack of another peer
power in the system which could effectively check the U.S. actions allowed America to act with
impunity and unilaterally(Walt, 2009). Sometimes, apart from its intention, the U.S. can also
inadvertently harm a regional nation’s interests. Since the geographical distance of the U.S. from
the ME region provides an extra secure buffer zone for adventurous policies and their uncalculated
spillover effects, it finds leeway to act more irresponsibly. Consequently, in the Middle East, under
the unipolar global order, aligning with the unrestrained U.S. has become less effective at solving
a regional state’s security problems.
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Since 1991, many of the regional countries including Turkey have come to see American
policies such as invading Iraq, supporting regime change in Iran and applying never-ending
sanction regimes to regional states, as destabilizing acts. These policies have created ungoverned
spaces and flocks of refugees, reduced local economic transactions and exacerbated ethnic and
sectarian tensions.
Therefore, the nations with rising trajectories and sufficient material capabilities, which
profit from the current status quo and have vested interest in the continuation of the regional
stability, have twisted the nature of the regional structure towards anarchy by rejecting
interventionist policies and pursuing more autonomous strategy (Bilgel, 2014). For example, Iran,
a state directly threatened by the U.S., took up a policy of internal (hard) balancing and began to
develop nuclear weapons as well as proliferating Shia proxy groups to counter the unipole in the
Greater Middle East as a part of its forward defense strategy. Another example is Turkey, which
was a loyal NATO ally with a complete Western-centric alignment during the Cold War, but has
begun to pursue a more independent policy, including policies that sometimes are in conflict with
U.S. strategies.
Analogously, in his analysis of the East Asian regional order, Sun Xuefeng asserts that the
system in East Asia is a quasi-anarchical one, within which the states form hierarchical subsystems in terms of security relations. In other words, it is a system which encompasses a
hierarchical sub-system regarding security issues. He divides states into three different categories
according to how they seek security. He describes the first type as the security guarantor, a state
which can provide security guarantees to its client states as well as defend itself. The second
category includes the client states which lack the ability to respond to main security threats and
depend on the security of a guarantor state. He categorizes the third type countries as the self-help

40

states, which rely on their own capacity to deal with threats but are not capable of providing
protection to other nations. Later he classifies the predominant security relations in a quasianarchical system primarily as competition (between two self-help states or between self-help
states and the security guarantor) and as dependence relation (between client states and the security
guarantor) (Xuefeng, 2013).
Similarly, Walt maintains that in a unipolar world order, in which security threats have
diminished, the smaller partner of an alliance may prefer to take back its autonomy. However, he
also presents another mechanism, which is relevant to the changing nature of Turkish foreign
policy, positing that alliances are affected in multiple ways in the unipolar world order. These
include the so-called twin dangers of “abandonment” (not receiving support in case of crisis or
war) and “entrapment” (being compelled to participate in a conflict unwillingly). In unipolarity,
because the unipole’s need for smaller partners decreases, weaker states have to be concerned more
about abandonment.
On the other hand, the stronger partner (in this case the U.S.) will worry less about
entrapment (being pulled into a conflict) by a reckless ally. Still, free from peer power opposition,
the unipole becomes more prone to fight wars. Walt argues that, in contrast with the findings, just
as happened during the 2003 Second Gulf War against Iraq, the U.S. can put intensive pressure on
weaker states to make them join the war on its side. Therefore, they become more vulnerable to
being entrapped in unipole policies exclusively (Walt, 2009).
In conclusion, it is possible to state that the unipolar structure triggered two critical
dynamics in the system. First, it has eased the risk perception, which induced Turkey to get its
autonomy back. Second, being entrapped in the constant interventionist policies of the unipole,
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which has significantly hindered economic development and created spillover effects that
produced existential security threats, Turkey has chosen to be a more independent actor.
Up to now, this section attempted to explain the most relevant structural effects on Turkey’s
changed foreign policy. In the following part, the study will focus on testing the arguments
mentioned above.

Behavioral Mechanism for the Regional States and Testing the Theory
Since a part of the thesis posits that the systemic change and the increased material
capabilities of Turkey are the leading causes for the changed (independent) behavior, it should be
valid for the other states, which share the same structural effects. Also, the theory must prove that
if the material capabilities are not sufficient, the states develop more dependent relations with their
security providers. Moreover, one should observe a correlation between fear of abandonment and
insufficient material capability as well as between fear of entrapment and potency to cope with
security threats.
This part of the study will focus on testing the claim. In order to explain the regional states’
behaviors in relation to other powers in the system, there is a need to categorize all related actors
hierarchically and functionally.

Classification of Relevant Actors
In this study, after a review of the literature,6 the term “great power” is used for states that
have global power projection capabilities as well as an interest in running the global order. These

6

For example, see Detlef Nolte, "How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research
Topics," Review of International Studies 36, no. 4 (Oct 1, 2010), 881-901, and Huntington, Samuel P., 1999 The
Lonely Superpower or Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," in Small
States in International Relations. (2006), 55-76.
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states show stable power trajectories with minimal internal/developmental problems. They are
capable of providing security to the aligned states at the global level. Most recently in history, the
USSR and the U.S. were the two actors that deserve to be named as great powers. Today, as the
single great power, the U.S. is generally described with the terms unipole, preponderant power or
superpower. It is the unipole; therefore, the whole systemic structure is constituted and dominated
by its preferences. States experience U.S influence in nearly all interactions within the international
system. Thus, the Middle East nations’ relations with the U.S. widely represent unit-system
exchanges with the system. Similarly, this study accepts Washington-Ankara relations as a strong
indicator to evaluate structural pressures on Turkey. Indeed, the test case of the thesis focuses on
the Middle East region, where most of the interactions between Turkey and the U.S. occur.
On the other hand, the term “regional great power” refers to countries that are part of a
particular region and have the capability to defend themselves against any coalition of other states
in the region, states which are highly dominant in regional affairs and have the potential to become
a superpower sometime in the future (Neumann, 1992). They are not “great powers” yet, because
they have problems such as domestic instabilities or insufficient overall economic development.
In addition, they can be categorized as states with region-wide (not global) power projection
capabilities and actors with the ability to provide limited security guarantees to other the countries
in a regional context (Nolte, 2010). These states are highly influential on the unipole's regional
policies, but they are not necessarily considered seriously in calculations regarding the other parts
of the globe (Buzan & Waever, 2010). In the system, they are potential peer competitors and the
best available option to check the unipole’s destabilizing policies. Therefore, these powers
function as viable hedging or balancing options for the Middle Eastern states. They are the states
that enable the anarchical system in the region and provide options for self-help seeking countries.
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In the contemporary conjuncture, nations like China, Russia and to some extent the EU best fit the
aforementioned description.
In the next level of the hierarchical order come the “regional powers.” These states may
have a formidable army, large populations or a relatively significant GDP. However, they cannot
balance the major powers systematically,
and they have unstable power trajectories
(Bilgel, 2014). The characteristic features
of these states are a necessity for sustained
economic development, the existence of
internal instabilities, threats to regime
survival, and territorial integrity. In
addition, these countries are reactive to the

Figure 2. The Structure of International System.

regional balances and they indicate willingness and capacity to assume the role of stabilizer,
peacekeeper or peacemaker (Gilley & O'Neil, 2014).
To be more specific and relevant with the general argument, regional powers also need to
be divided into two sub-categories: (1) rising and (2) inert7 regional powers. In this context, “rising
regional powers” are the states which have the ability to efficiently deal with internal risks and
capability to defend themselves against another regional rival. These states’ power projection
capabilities are mostly sourced and sustained domestically. They have diversified economic
activities and trade relations in the region accompanied by potent leadership that can orchestrate

7

Bilgel classifies these states as rising or declining states. However, naming some states as declining does not fit
necessarily with the observation of actual situation and behavior. While the term “rising states” is an appropriate term
to describe nations that can mobilize their potential to embrace new opportunities in the existing regional order,
describing states as declining does not fit with reality. These states may not able to prevail the region due to the various
structural or conjectural reasons but they do not necessarily decline. Therefore, in this study they will be termed “inert”
states.
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national power elements. These states have a stake in the existing regional balance, which has
made them a prosperous and dominant actor in the region. They perceive the existing regional
status quo as favoring their interests. Rising regional powers have a vested interest in maintaining
the stability of the system because they have the potential to advance their national interest if it is
not interrupted by an extra-regional power. Israel, Turkey, and Iran are good examples that meet
these criteria.
On the other hand, inert regional powers are states which may have relatively adequate
resources in comparison with the rising regional states, yet they are bereft of the capability to deal
with internal and external threats effectively. Also, their military power mostly originates from
arms imports with a relatively small proportion of indigenous production of modern military
equipment. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt, and partly the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) suit classification in the “inert regional power” category.
According to a survey done in spring 2017 by Pew Research Center, among the five major
Middle Eastern states (Turkey, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) the key Middle East public
see Turkey (63%) and Iran (53%) playing a larger role in the region in comparison with 10 years
ago. Fewer said Saudi Arabia’s role in the region had grown (41%) and even fewer expressed a
belief that Egypt’s prominence had increased (19%). About half of the public saw Israel playing a
larger role (46%) (Fetterolf & Poushter, 2017).
The final category is smaller states. This category contains geographically small countries,
failed states or administrations that lack many capabilities or resources to act effectively against
other actors. Therefore, they resort to aligning themselves with another power. Countries like
Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Qatar fit into this classification.
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The position of the Regional States in the Structural Spectrum
The Hierarchical Structure. Figure 1 depicts the position of the regional states in two
categories. The states positioned in the hierarchical order of the region are comprised of inert
regional powers and small states. Their common features are (1) internal insecurity and a lack of
regime legitimacy, (2) inadequate internal balancing capacity against regional rivals, and (3) nonexistent or minimal power projection capabilities. Most importantly, all of these states have regime
legitimacy issues and internal insecurities. They are absolute monarchies who cannot be confident
of popular support, authoritarian minority regimes or states that have failed due to internal unrest.
For example, the KSA and the UAE, the two most capable Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC),
are absolute monarchies that eliminate any political opposition. Therefore, they are afraid of
popular Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movements that endanger the reigning families’ rule.
Likewise, Bahrain is a small island state where a 60% Shia population is ruled by a Sunni
administration. Iraq, Syria, and Yemen remain at crisis points, mired in various sectarian and
ethnic conflicts.
Second, these countries are incapable of dealing with regional rivalries and spillover effects
of conflicts due to limited domestic resources. Small states like Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar,
even though they suffer relatively few domestic tensions, cannot handle regional rivalries on their
own and prefer to outsource their security needs. Also, they are too small to resist the pressure of
the U.S. and escape from the unipole's gravity. For example, as an economically developing
country, Jordan depends on the KSA and U.S. monetary support. Since June 2018, Jordan has
faced grave internal economic and political tensions, triggered by the spillover effects of the
regional crises in Iraq and Syria (Younes, 2018). Sharing borders around crises points such as
Israel, Palestine, and Syria, it depends on the U.S. to establish stability.
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Since June 2017, the KSA and some other countries have severed diplomatic relations with
Qatar and threatened that state with isolation if it fails to meet their demands to cease supporting
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In response, Doha has developed even closer security relations
with Washington. It signed $20 billion worth in contracts to buy new fighter jets from the U.S.,

Figure 3. The Behavioral Mechanism for Regional States.

Britain, and France as a means of gaining Western support (The Economist, 2018a). In August
2018, Qatar decided to expand Udeid air base, which is the largest U.S. military facility in the
region (Reuters, 2018).
Oman is a country which strongly disagrees with KSA and UAE policies. Even though it
is a member state of the GCC, Sultan Qaboos bin Said does not share Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s
view of Iran. Historically, Oman has had a strong relationship with Great Britain and kept its
distance from the U.S. Yet, despite its lack of interest in such regional American-led initiatives as
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the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), as a member of the GCC it cannot resist the pressure
of the U.S. Similarly, Kuwait does not favor the idea of an aggressive approach to countering
Iranian influence, but it as a GCC member it was entrapped in the MESA initiative (The
Economist, 2018b).
Some states like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon lost their national unity due to prolonged
conflicts and sectarian divides. Currently, Iraq is endeavoring to rebuild its destroyed cities and
faces difficulties in dealing with the social unrest in Basra province. Also, despite the successful
election on 12 May 2018, due to the polarization of the state, Iraq cannot establish a government
as of the time of writing. Similarly, due to the prolonged civil war and many exogenous
involvements, Syria’s Assad regime has become dependent on Iranian and Russian military
support. Today, in contrast with other Arab nations, it has become a client state of Russia.
Finally, the inert regional states (Egypt and the KSA) do not possess sustainable power
projection capacities. The KSA generates an enormous amount of wealth and has significant
military force which possesses first-class American equipment. According to the CIA World
Factbook, in 2017, with a GDP of $1,798 trillion in purchasing power parity terms ($687 billion
in current U.S. dollars) the Saudi economy ranked 16th largest in the world. International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that KSA military expenditures for the last three years (201516-17) exceed 12 percent of its GDP, which equals $76.7 billion a year. When we compare this to
Russia ($61.2 billion), France ($48.6 billion), and Germany ($41.7 billion) we see that it is an
extraordinary level of spending (Cordesman, 2018). Although in terms of GDP and the size of its
existing military force, the KSA could be classified as a rising regional power, the Yemen war
proves that Riyadh does not possess capable power projection capacity in its close neighborhood.
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First, the campaign in Yemen, which primarily was devoted to countering Iranian
influence, has been heavily dependent on U.S. air re-fuel capability and the import of American
precision ammunition. Second, nearly all of the arms that are the prerequisite of conducting the
operations in modern warfare fashion are purchased from abroad. Riyadh is the world’s largest
armaments importer, and its domestic contribution to arms production is negligible
(www.globalsecurity.org, 2018). Thus, the KSA stays in the hierarchical order with high
dependence on the U.S. as a security provider.
Likewise, following the Arab Spring upheaval, Egypt has fallen in the hands of a weak and
insecure authoritarian regime, which is mainly occupied with internal threats and is not capable of
maintaining its traditional leadership role in the Arab world. With a population of 97.55 million
people, Egypt is the region’s most populous state. However, its GDP is relatively low, and it has
dropped sharply from $333 billion (in 2016) to $235 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2019). Its wealth
ranks far below that of Israel, which has 8.71 million people and a GDP of $351 billion. Since
2015, in an attempt to boost economic growth, the Egyptian administration has embarked on an
economic reform plan, which has become a significant problem for the majority of the low-income
population (Barfi, 2018).
Egypt receives the third largest amount of American aid in the region (Israel and Iraq
receive more.) In 2017, Egypt devoted 88 percent of the total $1.475 billion in aid it received from
the US to the modernization of its military. Egypt is the largest arms producer in the Arab world,
but most of its industry is low tech and is incapable of producing the state-of-the-art weapons that
are required in modern warfare (Lee, 2018; USAID, 2018).
One of the clearest examples of Egypt’s lack of efficiency and power projection capacity
is the 2018 operations against the ISIS-allied Ansar Beit al-Maqdis group in the Sinai Peninsula.
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The Peninsula has a long history of insurgent activity against the government, and since the start
of the Libyan civil war, Cairo has had difficulties in preventing the infiltration of more
sophisticated weapons into the region. The targeting of an Egyptian ship with a Kornet anti-tank
missile and the downing of a civilian Metrojet Flight 9268 in October 2015 increased government
determintion to eliminate terrorism(Ghafar, 2018). Subsequently, the government launched large
scale anti-terror operations, as a result of which at least 172 terrorists, 100 Egyptian soldiers, and
500 civilians lost their lives in 2017. The rate of losses are much higher in comparison to
international standards of any Counter Terrorism (CT) type operation.
An article in The New York Times revealed a significant event by reporting that Israel had
carried out more than 100 air strikes in Sinai with the knowledge of Egyptian authorities
(Kirkpatrick, 2018). According to the article, some American officials claimed that Israel’s air
campaign made a decisive contribution to the Egyptian anti-terror campaign, enabling the
Egyptians to gain the upper hand over the militants (Frantzman, 2018). Previously, accepting
military support from Israel would not have been considered even as a last resort. These
developments indicate the lack of capacity of Egypt to project power even inside its territory due
to a lack of advanced abilities. Therefore, the KSA and Egypt hold the position of “inert regional
power,” the policy preference of which is staying aligned with the unipole.
On top of everything, all of the hierarchical order states have a common anxiety, which
is the possibility of “abandonment” by their sponsor states (Walt, 2009). Being unchecked by a
peer power, which is a sharp divergence from Cold War times, the U.S. has become less bound to
its commitments and has become a less reliable actor. Therefore, the states of hierarchical order
strive to guarantee the predominant state’s commitments to them by moving closer to the sponsor
or hedge against possible insecurities by approaching other major powers to consolidate
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commitments. The best examples in the region of a state getting closer to the unipole with the
objective of avoiding abandonment are the KSA’s and Qatar’s large-scale arms purchases. Even
though both of these states do not have adequate personnel to run their existing equipment, they
continue to import additional arms. In other words, states with sufficient monetary assets try to
avoid abandonment by buying the continuation of the unipole’s political support in the form of
military contracts.
Other states prefer to hedge the U.S. by developing ties with Russia and China. A clear
example of this strategy is presented by Egypt’s behavior. Being afraid of abandonment, Cairo
invites another major rival into the region in order to secure the U.S.’s perpetual commitment.
Today, Egypt is applying a clear hedging strategy toward U.S. policies by seeking Moscow’s
cooperation in the military domain (Defense Industry Daily, 2016). After the military coup against
the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, Washington normalized its diplomatic relations with Cairo and
released previously suspended monetary support (Lee, 2018). While the U.S. was trying to
reinvigorate its military ties and conducting combined exercises (Belnap, 2018), Egypt granted air
access to Russia and participated in similar exercises with Moscow (Egyptdefenceexpo, 2018).
The Anarchical Structure. The second category in Figure 1 is comprised of the states
which are previously defined as rising regional powers. These countries show proficiency in
dealing with internal problems and they can internally balance any regional rival. Therefore, they
are more interested in peer competitors and great power interventions, which can significantly
damage their interests. These states are in the ascendant because they benefit from the existing
structure. The last thing they would like is an intervention that could destabilize the existing
friendly environment and prevent the extraction of benefits. Also, these states are concerned with
policies of the unipole that might be detrimental to their internal security, territorial integrity or
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national interest. In an effort to prevent adverse outcomes and maximize regional stability, these
states pursue policies that are more autonomous and sometimes at odds with the U.S.
Iran. For example, Iran, a country that is directly threatened by the unipole, tries to balance
the U.S. internally (with nuclear weapons and proxy groups). As of 2019, despite reliance on
outsourcing some sophisticated aerospace technology, Tehran has developed an arms program and
self-sufficient domestic production of military hardware. Iran can manufacture armored personnel
carriers, tanks, missiles, radars of all kinds, small ships, submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), and a fighter plane. This equipment includes UAVs with assault capabilities, electrooptically guided glide-bombs, and 2000 km ranged cruise missiles(Globalsecurity.org, 2016),
essential elements of modern warfare.
Its special forces operatives, also known as Quds forces, have left their fingerprints on the
mobilization of Shia groups which have become effective political actors in countries such as Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. For example, the Iranian intelligence and security services, which
have advised and assisted the Syrian military, were the decisive component in Bashar al-Assad’s
success in reclaiming power in Syria. Tehran has an expeditionary force in Syria comprised of
Quds Force, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, and law enforcement
and intelligence services. The deployment of the IRGC to fight in a foreign country is a significant
piece evidence that shows Iranian ability to project power beyond its borders (Fulton, Holliday,
& Wyer, 2013)
Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has opposed the U.S. presence in the region and actively
attempts to counter Washington policies by using an asymmetrical approach. Showing a particular
ability at force projection powered by domestic material sources, Iran is the primary actor which
balances the unipole with other major powers. Having a common anti-Western foreign policy
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attitude, Tehran cooperates with Moscow to balance Washington’s activities. For example, during
the Syrian Civil War, Iran’s pervasive pro-regime land forces created a suitable venue to extend
Russian strategic air capabilities. Through cooperation with Iran, Russia has boosted its limited
military presence in Syria and managed to gain the status of the security provider to the Assad
regime.
With self-sufficient domestic arms production, a population of 82.4 million people and a
GDP that approaches half a trillion (World Bank, 2018); Iran is a state that cannot be coerced to
submit and accept the hierarchical order of the unipole.
Turkey. After overcoming a devastating economic crisis at the beginning of the 21st
century, Turkey’s economy has improved significantly. Table 1 displays GDP improvement of the
country since the end of the bipolar world order and the ratio between the American and Turkish
economies.
Table 1. The Increase of Turkey’s GDP in Current US Dollars-World Bank, 2018. 8

GDP Current US Dollar (Billion)
1990
TR

1993

1996

1999

$150,676 $180,170 $181,476 $255,884

2002

2005

2008

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

$238,428

$501,416

$764,336

$832,524

$873,982

$950,579

$934,186

$859,797

$863,722

$851,102

USA $5,980,000 $6,879,000 $8,100,000 $9,661,000 $10,978,000 $13,094,000 $14,719,000 $15,518,000 $16,155,000 $16,692,000 $17,428,000 $18,121,000 $18,624,000 $19,391,000
Ratio

39.6

38.1

44.6

37.7

46

26.1

19.2

18.6

18.4

17.6

18.7

21.1

21.5

22.8

While the U.S. was nearly 40 times a bigger economy at the beginning of the unipolarity,
the ratio had fallen in half after 2008, which coincides with the Shift of Axis argument. Considering
that the U.S. represents the structure of the system by itself, Turkey’s self-confidence in opposing
U.S. policy preferences correlates with its increased material capability.

8

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2017&locations=US-TR&start=1960&view=chart
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Organized in terms of purchase power parity (PPP), Table 2 depicts a more revealing
approach to the structure (U.S.) and unit (Turkey) comparison. PPP provides an alternative aspect
by removing currency differences and displays the actual material meaning of the GDP for each
actor.
Table 2. The increase of Turkey’s GDP in Power Purchase Parity -Constant 2011 Int Dollar World Bank, 2018. 9

GDP, PPP (Constant 2011 international Dollar in Billions)
1990
TR
USA
Ratio

614,717

1993
700,08

1996

1999

2002

773,111

822,053

877,379 1,107,000 1,256,000 1,443,000 1,512,000 1,641,000 1,726,000 1,831,000 1,889,000 2,029,000

2005

2008

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

9,252,000 9,836,000 10,911,000 12,465,000 13,336,000 14,706,000 15,321,000 15,518,000 15,863,000 16,129,000 16,544,000 17,017,000 17,270,000 17,662,000
15.2

14.04

14.1

15.2

15.2

13.3

12.2

10.8

10.5

9.8

9.6

9.3

9.1

8.7

The figures show that since the beginning of the unipolar world order, Turkey has gradually
decreased the discrepancy between the scales of the two economies by half. Also, one can observe
that the Turkish economy has grown nearly five-fold between 1990 and 2008 according to nominal
GDP (See Table 1).
According to the CIA Factbook and the World Bank, Turkey has the world’s 13th largest
GDP in terms of PPP, and 17th in nominal prices10. Therefore, with an economy of this size, Turkey
is a member of the G20.
Concurrently, the Turkish defense industry, which had contributed only 20 percent of the
total needs of Turkey’s armed forces at the beginning of the 2000s, increased its proportion to 65
percent in 2019. At the opening ceremony of Turkish defense firm BMC's 500 million dollars’
worth new factory, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that “Turkey's dependency on imported
military hardware has been reduced from 80 percent to 35 percent over the last 16 years.” He also

9

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD?end=2017&locations=US-TR&start=1960&view=
chart
10
For 2018, IMF prediction for nominal prices ranks Turkey as the world’s 19 th largest economy, while CIA
Factbook and World Bank estimates as 17th. There is no discrepancy about the rank in PPP terms.
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praised the defense industry's success as exporters in 2018; exports had increased 17 percent over
2017 and had exceeded the goal of $2 billion (Daily Sabah, 2019).
In 2017, SIPRI named Brazil, India, and Turkey as the “emerging producers” because of
their companies on the Top 100 list11. After affirming the 24 percent rise in the arms sales of
Turkish companies in 2017, the report recognized Turkey as a country with ambitions to advance
its military industry in order to fulfill the growing domestic demand for arms and due to a desire
to become less reliant on foreign suppliers (SIPRI, 2018).
The Turkish desire to equip its armed forces with the product of domestic industry is linked
to various embargos that Turkey has faced during past national crises. The embargo decision of
the U.S. in 1974, a response to Turkish intervention in Cyprus, had a profound impact on the
Turkish psyche. This embargo hindered Turkey’s ability to acquire military equipment between
1975 and 1978, including jets which had already been paid for and spare parts for the Western
platforms that were in its inventory. At a public event President Erdogan noted: Our strategic
partners disabled the military systems they sold to us back in 1974. Turkey was punished by its
own allies when it intervened against the genocide of the Turkish Cypriots. But Turkey is now
capable of building its own facilities."
Also, he emphasized that this embargo cost Turkey billions of dollars and that Turkey
needed to mobilize the country’s industrial base in support of the defense industry in order to avoid
falling into a similar situation again (Daily Sabah, 2019). A similar event occurred in 1992, when
the German government, fearful of unrest among the Kurdish population in Germany, placed

11

Turkey has two companies in the Top 100: Electronics producers ASELSAN, which claimed the rank 61 (68 th in
2016) and the aircraft producing Turkish Aerospace Industries that claimed the rank 70 (77 th in 2016). Brazil had
only one company ranking 84th on the list.
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restrictions on the usage of German made equipment in Turkey’s fight against the PKK in South
East Anatolia (Yilmaz, 2015).
Being located in a very volatile region, Turkey believes a modern and self-reliant military
is essential for its national security. Therefore, in the last decades, Turkey has increased its
domestic military production capacity by investing in the defense industry. While procuring
needed military goods domestically, Turkey has also become a fast-growing exporter of military
equipment (Tekingunduz, 2018). The military industry reached $6.7 billion of the economy,
exports of which was $1.82 billion in 2017 and $2.04 billion in 2018. According to the Turkish
Defense and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association, received orders in 2018 were $8
billion, and the Turkish defense industry creates job opportunities for 44,740 people in total
(SaSaD, 2018). As of January 2019, the Turkish defense industry has signed significant contracts,
such as 30 indigenous T129 Advanced Attack and Reconnaissance Helicopters, $1.5 billion worth
warships deal with Pakistan; an order for ten helicopters from the Philippines, and an order for 12
Bayraktar TB2 operational unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Ukraine (Daily Sabah, 2019).
Table 3. Export of Turkish Defense Industry (Baran, 2018).

Export of Turkish Defense Industry
Years
Million $

2013
1570

2014
1855

2015
1929

2016
1953

2017
1824

2018
2040

While many NATO members decreased military spending after the Cold War (the so-called
“Peace Dividend”), Table 4 shows that Turkey did not. Indeed, its military spending is closely
related to the intensity of the national fight against the terrorism of the PKK. After the capture of
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan at the end of 1998, expenditure gradually dropped and began to
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increase when only the Counter Terrorist (CT) operations intensified again. Also, the Syrian Civil
War and the emergence of ISIS increased the burden of military expenditure.
Table 4. Military Expenditure of Turkey in constant US dollars.

Military expenditure of Turkey in constant (2016) US$ m., 2009-2017 © SIPRI 2018
1990
10770
2000
16890
2010
14050

1991
11071
2001
15483
2011
14187

1992
11645
2002
16474
2012
14498

1993
12875
2003
14869
2013
14857

1994
12588
2004
13569
2014
14942

1995
12932
2005
12846
2015
15412

1996
14478
2006
13784
2016
17854

1997
15084
2007
13252
2017
19580

1998
15806
2008
13401

1999
17452
2009
14340

Based on the SIPRI database, Turkish military expenditure’s share of GDP is around 2%.
However, a rare study by Yenturk (Table 5) shows that (including all resources) military spending
is higher than 2%. Also, it is possible to observe how the increased national GDP has provided
more financial allocation, despite the constant share in general (Yenturk, 2014).
Table 5. Turkish Military Expenditure and Share in GDP %.
Military Expanses of Turkey (Includes Foundations and Other Resources)
2006
Total military
expanses
Share in GDP %

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

19,416 20,349 22,727 25,879 27,610 29,742 33,815 37,562 41,104 44, 332
2.56

2.41

2.39

2.72

2.51

2.29

2.36

2.39

2.36

2.29

In addition, in order to increase efficiency, the Turkish Armed Forces has transformed its
structure to smaller and flexible units, which are better suited to conduct urban warfare and CT
operations. In 2009, due to the public debates regarding the conscripted soldiers’ ability to fight
against seasoned terrorists, the Supreme Military Council decided to increase the proportion of
professional units. These moves significantly extended Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) operational
capability as well as the ability of the nation to handle prolonged conflicts.
Even after the 15 July 2016 failed military coup attempt, which resulted in the purge of
many military professionals, Turkey successfully conducted Operation Euphrates Shield between
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August 24, 2016, and March 30, 2017, and Operation Olive Branch (January-March, 2018) in
Northern Syria. These operations were an excellent opportunity to test the resilience of TAF
structure and the efficiency of domestically produced modern warfare arms. Moreover, by
organizing and using the Free Syrian Army, which was comprised of moderate opponents of the
Syrian regime, Turkey proved that it could also project power by using local partners and groups
as proxies.
In conclusion, having been in a constant struggle against terrorism and instabilities in the
region, Turkey has improved its military structure and has increased self-sufficiency by producing
the critical arms that are required in modern conflicts. In addition, the coup attempt organized by
Fethullah Gulen supporters became a good test case for regime resilience and ability to overcome
internal threats. Thus, with a growing GDP and military competence, Turkey increased its national
power and thus its ability to pursue a more independent policy, a decisive factor in fostering the
observed changes in Turkish foreign policy.
Israel. Israel has exceptional ties with the U.S. Despite this close relationship, occasional
tensions between the two states do occur. However, when a U.S. policy becomes detrimental to
Israeli interests, Tel Aviv uses its vast influence on the U.S. domestic political establishment. For
example, during the Obama administration in 2015, there was a fundamental disagreement
between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama over the approach to Iran’s
nuclear program.
In 2015, the Israelis and the Republican Party majority leader arranged a joint session in
Congress for Israeli president Netanyahu without notifying the White House. During the event, he
criticized Obama administration policies, which infuriated the administration. The Obama
administration perceived the incident as Israel and the opposition party working together to
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interfere with presidential authority over foreign policy and undermine efforts to strike a nuclear
deal with Tehran (Beauchamp, 2015). Due to its economic situation and power projection
capabilities, Tel Aviv is not a dependent state. Since the U.S. has an interest in Israel’s wellbeing,
frequently their policy preferences converge. Although Israel greatly benefits from the U.S.’s proIsraeli stance, it does not hesitate to act against the U.S. when it perceives a need to do so. Tel
Aviv frequently uses balancing strategies when it feels that the U.S. obligations to meet
international expectations regarding the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) can entrap

Israel

into making a compromise which it deems unacceptable.
With arms exports of $7.9 billion, Israel accounted for 2% of the total revenues of the Top
100 defense companies. Although it is a small state, Israel’s arms sales are relatively high
(Kuimova, Tian, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2018). Israeli defense industry produces arms, which
meet U.S. equivalent high-tech specification. Also, the Israeli military frequently displays its
power projection capability in its close neighborhood. Currently, the Tel Aviv government has
proved its willingness to use the military against Iranian formations in Syria. Its self-sufficient
military and proven power projection abilities facilitate Israel’s ability to diverge from U.S. policy
preferences and pursue a more autonomous path. For that reason, it takes the position in the
hierarchical order in the regional structural spectrum.

Conclusion
In this Chapter, the study formulated a mechanism for describing regional states’ behavior
in a unipolar systemic structure. The analysis showed that states with improved national power
tend to act more independently vis a vis regional policy preference of the unipole. Countries that
can be classified as rising regional powers adopt a self-help system that provides a certain amount
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of autonomy from the unipole. These states are the source of the hybrid nature of IR regional
structure in the Middle East under unipolarity.
It also revealed that in the Middle East a sound economic situation is not enough to enable
pursuit of independent policies. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter accidentally discovered that
a pure military built-up is not enough to take an independent position. It is the armed forces, which
have power projection capabilities based on domestic military procurement, that allow
autonomous actions. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a military equipped with topnotch American equipment and arms. Yet, it had to be submissive to U.S. demands regarding the
campaign in Yemen after the looming arms embargo.
The next chapter will link the objectives of Turkey with the debated policy changes.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
TURKEY TAKES INDEPENDENT POSITION

Introduction
This chapter claims that Turkey is taking an independent position to realize its foreign
policy preferences. It asserts that Ankara’s increased regional engagements are the outcome of
taking an independent position and they are intended to pursue national objectives.
The first section will define the national objectives of the state. Later, it will describe how
the transformation of the international systemic structure and its effects on Turkey created a
paradigm shift about the existing alliance relations.
Afterward, to describe the changed behavior, it will connect Turkey's need for maximizing
the national objectives with the new approach of realizing them. This part of the study emphasizes
Ankara's inability to defuse security threats and achieve economic development by staying allied
to Washington as the primary cause that endorsed policymakers to reduce dependence on the U.S.
and to adopt a self-help approach.
Finally, it will conduct an empirical analysis, which encompasses the most significant
events since the beginning of the unipolarity, to diagnose whether Turkey pursues an independent
approach or shifting axis.
The overall aim is to overcome the fallacies of half-way explanations that mostly describe
the objective of Turkish foreign policy as "increasing its influence" in the region. Frequently, the
advocates of axis shift, neo-Ottomanism or other unit-level explanations implicitly link or present
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it as an "end in itself." Thus, Turkey's changed behavior patterns and increased activities in DIME
are erroneously interpreted as actions with hegemonic purposes. Since the U.S. has already
dominated the region and Turkey does not have the ability or desire to alter the power distribution,
explanations of Turkey’s foreign policy are based on erroneous assumptions.
Besides, while many criticize Turkey’s new independent policies as distancing itself from
the West, they fail to discern the internal tensions in the Transatlantic block. For example, due to
geographical proximity, Europeans are also endangered by the spillover effects of the U.S. over
activism. Therefore, Turkey's position regarding the invasion of Iraq or Iran's nuclear program is
very close to that of the E3 (France, Germany, and Britain.) Also, criticism of American activities
in Falluja or of Israeli abuses of human rights much like those voiced by Turkey are not uncommon
in Europe (Danforth, 2008). Since there is no consistent Western position, it would be deceptive
to describe Turkey's refusal to comply with U.S. demands as an indicator of its split with the
Western bloc (Ozcan, 2008).

The Primary Objective of Turkey in the Middle East: Seeking Stability
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, based on Kemal Ataturk's vision,
the country's primary objectives have been to (1) consolidate/secure the state's international and
domestic sovereignty and (2) reach the level of contemporary Western civilizations in
development. In parallel with the founding fathers, Turkish elites have always valued the nation's
economic development as much as security.
Efforts to build the nation by advancing social development and to achieve reconstruction
of the country by increasing industrial and economic capacity continued after the establishment of
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the state. During most of the Republic’s history, development and welfare were central to the
rhetoric and vision of the ruling élites.
Most recently, in the "2023 Vision," Turkey still heavily prioritized development projects.
This plan sets as the nation's objective becoming one of the top ten economies in the world by
2023. Turkey has envisaged expanding its GDP to $2 trillion, achieving a per capita income of
$25,000, attaining a balanced annual trade size of $1trillion, increasing the employment rate to
over 50% of the population, reducing unemployment to 5%, and decreasing the level of
government involvement in many areas (Republic of Turkey Investment Support and Promotion
Agency, 2011).
To achieve a high level of export volume, Turkey plans to increase the numbers of
exporters, create internationally known brands, support high-tech value-added products, and assist
critical sectors such as automotive, machinery, steel, textile, electronics, and chemicals.
In order to reconstruct the nation, Turkey has made infrastructure investments which can
support economic productivity such as 16 new large-scale logistic centers, 36,500 km of dual
carriageway, 7,500 km of motorway, 70.00 km with bitumen hot-mix asphalt, a submarine tube
for cars in Istanbul, three bridges on the Bosporus, a bridge on the Dardanelles, and railway
projects to connect Turkey with the Middle East, Caucasus, and North Africa.
Moreover, Ankara has envisaged building new airports with capacity for 400 million
passengers per year, a 750-plane fleet and two aviation maintenance and training centers,
connecting main ports with railways, establishing transfer ports, and having at least one of the top
10 ports in the world by 2019. To exploit the advantage of its location, Turkey has planned to reach
32 million TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) handling capacity for container transport, handle 500
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million tons of solid & 350 million liquid load, reach 10 million deadweight tonnage shipbuilding
ability and construct 100 marinas with 50,000 yacht potential.
In addition, Turkey has a target of 30 million broadband subscribers, plans to increase the
proportion of national contribution to 50% in the Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) sector, raise the ICT sector's share of GDP to 8%, become one of the top 10 countries in etransformation, and to provide all public services electronically by 2019. There are also essential
objectives in securing energy, reaching 50 million tourists with $50 billion in revenue, and
increasing innovation by supporting Research and Developments activities with up to 3 percent of
GDP.
In the realm of defense, Turkey has undertaken the production of rifles, artillery, tanks,
helicopters, and fighter aircraft domestically. Development of a domestic tank and fighter plane
industry continues; the armed forces have already received delivery of the other military hardware.
A high proportion of the national objectives focus on national development. During the
import-substitution era, non-involvement in the volatile Middle Eastern region was a viable option
to create a conducive environment for development. Since the transition to the neoliberal market
economy, within which growth and prosperity come from exports, traditional isolationist policies
were no longer an appropriate strategy for national development. To maximize growth, the new
"outwards looking" economic approach has compelled Turkey to develop mechanisms for global
and local integration within the regions, where Turkey can potentially flourish. However, the
constant regional conflicts have continuously created domestic and regional security concerns that
have interrupted much needed economic integration. Therefore, sustaining “regional stability”
became the intersection and the prerequisite to achieving both security and economic integration
in the Middle East (Figure 3).
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Objectives of Turkey

Economic
Development

Stability

Security

Figure 4. Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy.

During the Cold War, Turkey was the unquestioned ally of NATO and the West against
the USSR and Warsaw Pact, which was the most significant threat at the time to national and
European security. Ankara in that period defined its national interest in the Middle East in parallel
with the West and considered its involvements as an extension of the Western security system
(Benli Altunisik, 2009). With the end of the Cold War and the U.S. emergence as the world's sole
superpower, the new architecture of the international system was transformed into unipolarity (G.
John Ikenberry et al., 2009; William C. Wohlforth, 1999) in which liberal democracies were the
winner. The new structure was meant to enforce democracy as the normative way of governance
and neoliberal markets as the prevailing economic approach. Having the willingness to adopt both,
Turkey was favorable to the U.S. dominated world order. However, Turkey's traditional relations
with its Cold War ally have begun to change after the new effects of unipolarity become visible.
The new international structure has provided the U.S. with many advantages. No other
major competitor exists that can restrain the U.S., and it can act with near impunity worldwide.
After the end of the Cold War, since the stability in the Middle East was frequently disturbed by
the unchecked unipole, Turkey has begun to experience difficulty in managing security risks and
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obtaining stability in the region. After the international systemic structure transformed into a
unipolar world, the functionality of traditional relations has eroded, which has brought along a
substantial paradigm shift in the methods of maximizing regional security and stability.

The Paradigm Shift and the New Strategy for Maximizing Stability
The Paradigm Shift
In light of the evidence, this study assumes that the structure of the international system is
unipolar and the U.S. is (still) the unipole (G. John Ikenberry et al., 2009; Lim, 2015; Walt, 2009;
William C. Wohlforth, 1999) . Therefore, Turkey's (unit) interaction with the system (the unipole)
is defined best in American-Turkish relations. After the First Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. became
Turkey’s new neighbor on its southern border, and their relations have been impacted mostly by
the developments in the Middle East.
Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has always had concerns about:
(1) the actions of major powers,
(2) regional rivals,
(3) internal destabilizing factors, and
(4) economic development of the country.
With the beginning of the unipolar order, despite some change in intensities, these concerns
have continued to be determinants of TFP. While the first three are security concerns, the fourth
element is economy-oriented.

Thus to "defuse security risks” and maintain “economic

development” have been the dual main objectives that have motivated Turkey's relations.
During the bipolar Cold War era, Turkey had successfully addressed these concerns
through a close alliance with the Western bloc. With the beginning of the unipolar international
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structure, Turkey's security concerns were expected to diminish. After all, Ankara was on the side
of the great power that won the Cold War; it was a large regional state with institutional ties to the
world's strongest security alliance (NATO) that rendered it a hard target for regional rivals.
Besides, despite the high cost, Turkey was able to deal with internal instabilities such as PKK
terror and political volatility.
Since its main ally, the U.S., was already dominant in the region, Turkey's major power
threat concerns were expected to decrease significantly. However, developments showed that even
though Turkey was not the target, the spillover effects of the unrestrained unipole posed severe
security threats to the country's territorial integrity and domestic stability.
In 1990-91, during the First Gulf War, Turkey supported the U.S. decision to fight with
dictator Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who had invaded Kuwait. During the coalition operation Turkey
amassed its troops to force Iraq to reserve a considerable amount of its military resources located
near the distant border with Turkey (Lally Weymouth, 1991). After the operation, Ankara allowed
coalition forces to fly from its territory to enforce the northern no-fly zone, which was formed to
protect the refugees from Saddam (Haldun Çancı & Şevket Serkan Şen, 2011). Turkey was
submissive to almost all policy decisions of the U.S., even to the ones that openly damaged national
interests such as accepting the closure of Turkish-Iraqi oil pipelines and strictly abiding by
imposed international sanctions.
By the mid-1990s, the developments in northern Iraq caused severe tensions in American–
Turkish relations. In the political debates, the U.S. was accused of supporting the establishment of
an independent Kurdish state in the north of Iraq. Also, during the post-war era, due to diminished
central government control, the PKK managed to find a safe haven in the north of Iraq and
increased its cross-border assaults on Turkey. The unlimited support during the first Gulf War to
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the U.S. cost 80 billion dollars in lost trade, and the increased cross border PKK attacks left 20,000
deaths (Altunisik, 2013). Besides, Turkey had to deal with half a million refugees when Saddam
attempted to control the northern part of the country. Thus, Turkey has experienced that
destabilized neighbors have direct effects that jeopardize national security, because of the spillover
effects such as refugees, ungoverned places suitable as bases for terrorist activity, and diminished
economic benefits.
In 2003, although the status quo was not in favor of Turkey, Ankara had similar concerns
about the spillover effects of a potential war against the Saddam regime. Yet, the war occurred
despite Ankara's refusal to grant access for the U.S. troops to enter Iraq from its soil. Just like after
the Gulf War in 1991, the 2003 U.S. policies of military intervention increased concerns about
Iraq's territorial integrity, which had the potential to severely affect Turkey (Kanat et al., 2017).
After the conflict, Turkish officials have become increasingly suspicious of U.S. policies
because of the considerable gap between the declared intentions and emerged outcomes. For
example, the arguments of the U.S. for invading Iraq in 2003 were mainly linked to terrorism and
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) concerns. However, the post-invasion developments
showed that there were no WMD in Iraqi and the link between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaida was
artificial. Also, the human rights abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison put American credibility into
question. What is more, the U.S. ensured the formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) as an autonomous entity in Iraq, which increased the risk perception regarding territorial
integrity of Turkey.
During the occupation of Iraq, Ankara also resented Washington's policies meant to
stabilize Iraq after the U.S. withdrawal. For example, in the 2010 elections, although the Sunni
Iraqiya came out as the first party from the parliamentary election, the U.S. assigned Maliki, who
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was the leader of the second party, to form the government (Nasr, 2013). In his book, Nasr
describes him as a revenge-seeking Shia, a weak manager with authoritarian tendencies who
pursued a sectarian policy to ensure a Shia rise to power with the support of Iran. After his
inauguration, Maliki decided to eliminate his primary rival, Hashemi, who was the leader of the
leading Sunni party. During his visit to the U.S., he measured the possible U.S. reaction and felt
free to implement sectarian policies based on Shia dominance. As a result, Hashemi fled to Iraq's
Kurdish region and the conflict among the sectarian and ethnic groups revived. Thus, while
internal movements against Iraqi unity gained pace, foreign actors were involved in the theater.
Moreover, regardless of the ongoing struggles, U.S. policymakers contemplated an exit
strategy of forming a security state under an authoritarian leader which would secure American
interests and deliver a new Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) that would secure future U.S.
military and political influence. The US realized, however, that things were not going as planned,
as Maliki was eager to work with Iran rather than the U.S., and was reluctant to deliver a new
SOFA agreement (Nasr, 2013).
Many believe that the poorly conceived U.S. exit and its support for Maliki created a power
vacuum that caused the emergence of Isis. Maliki's sectarian policies have disenfranchised the
Sunni Iraqis and the lack of U.S. intention to maintain a presence in the region devastated Iraq's
integrity while producing further destabilizing effects for the area.
Similarly, continuous efforts of the U.S. administrations to isolate Syria and Iran have
negatively impacted Turkey's efforts to integrate its economy with the lucrative Middle Eastern
markets. Frequently, U.S. regional interventions have been part of an effort to foster liberal
democratic values in these states. Even though Turkey was not happy with the existing regimes, it
considered part of the geography that should not prevent normal relations between neighboring
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states. Any pressure which might destabilize these states was considered dangerous because of
possible spillover effects into Turkey. Therefore, as an ally of the U.S., besides dealing with the
spillover effects of the unipole’s policies, Turkey has been continuously entrapped in never-ending
sanctions and political restrictions in the region.
Turkey has begun to vocalize a new security paradigm, in which “the U.S. is both an ally
and a potential threat.” This new concept suits the structural model described in the previous
chapter. Since the unipole does not have a peer competitor, the U.S.'s need for allies has
diminished. Therefore, it does not have to stick to its previous commitments. The U.S. does not
constitute a direct threat to Turkey as it does to Iran, but it continues inadvertently harming
Turkey’s vital interests (Walt, 2009). For example, in the “Turkey Social Attitudes Research2018,” Kadir Has University found out that, at the end of 2018, 81.9 percent of Turkish population
believes that the U.S. is the number one security threat to Turkey, an increase of 17.6 percent over
previous year (Aydin et al., 2019).
This situation has become more evident as the U.S. has begun to choose controversial
regional partners and has attempted to create new formations that Turkey regards as a risk to
territorial integrity and regional stability. Since the unipole has leeway to change its partners
depending on the mission (Bilgel, 2014) and its regional policies have proven to be potentially
harmful to Turkey’s national interests, completely aligning with the U.S. (as Turkey did during
the Cold War) has lost its functionality and validity as a practical option to maximize Turkey’s
security needs.
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Realizing that Turkey cannot wholly rely on the U.S. to defuse threats, policymakers have
preferred to manage Turkey's regional security needs by reducing dependence on the U.S. and
adopting a self-help approach. In other words, Turkey, which has previously delegated
responsibility for security to the U.S., has taken this responsibility back. Yet, in order to
compensate the security vacuum created by the rejection of the unipole as main policy describer,
Turkey has needed to displace arrangements previously managed by the U.S. Therefore, depending
on itself, TFP has begun to display unprecedented diplomatic activities, establishing new military
and economic links, and undertaking an active approach in conflict resolution. Bilgel argues that
those states which adopt an independent approach will attempt to position themselves at the
midpoint of the politics in their region (Bilgel, 2014). These aims are reflected in former foreign
affairs minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s policy vision as (1) effective regional integration through
security and economic cooperation, (2) mediation of regional conflict resolution, and (3) active
participation in global affairs as well as international organizations (Davutoglu, 2011).

Figure 5. The New Conceptualization of Turkish Foreign Policy.
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From its own perspective, all these displacement attempts have been deployed to stabilize
the region in order to maintain the relative advantage that the Middle East had provided to Turkey.
It is important to stress that the threat is not the unipole itself, but the spillover effects of its regional
policies. Therefore, Turkey does not aim to oppose the U.S. and pursue conflictual policies
systematically but rather to obtain enough independence to shape some of the outcomes that
destabilize the region. In that sense, by re-positioning Turkey's national interests in the center of
its foreign policy, Turkey transformed itself from a small peripheral partner to an actor, which
desires to exert agency in the issues that have effects on its objectives. This new stance has become
the primary source of mixed relations with the U.S.
Contrary to the shift of axis argument that assumes the change of TFP is a choice of
preference of East over West, or the Neo-Ottomanism theory that suggests Turkey aims to
dominate the region, this study claims that Turkey has taken an independent position to achieve
its objectives. This conceptualization of TFP is also consistent with the observed reality in TurkishAmerican relations. Ankara does not flatly oppose the U.S. but in fact enjoys cooperating with
Washington. Thus, Turkey aims at maximizing stability in the region through cooperation and, if
needed, through indirect confrontation.

Strategy to Achieve Objectives
Frequently, depending on how relations will affect the (in)stability of the region, Ankara
has begun to cooperate or oppose Washington’s policy preferences. This study assumes that
linking main objectives with the means to achieve them can clarify the changing nature of TFP.
Table 6 displays the main objectives and the way of realizing them. Basically, all of the TFP
activities in the Middle East are addressed in the below-presented table.
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Table 6. Objective and Means for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Objectives
1

Establish/Maintain/Restore
Stability

2

Defuse security risks

3

Achieve economic
development

Means
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Integrate with the region
Pursue active diplomacy to mediate regional problems
Prevent destabilizing developments
Actively participate in restoring stability in favor of
national interest
Active diplomacy
Military cooperation
Military Bases
Military intervention
Remove obstacles to economic activities
Integrate with the regions that are potential markets
Increase attention to previously neglected areas

Establish, Maintain and Restore Stability. Turkey, as a rising country in the region, is
the primary beneficiary of stability in the Middle East. Since it has adopted a self-help system to
shape a more approachable region, Turkey has developed mixed relations. Even though the
changed Turkish foreign policy has been labeled a general opposition to U.S. policy preferences,
Ankara has continued to cooperate with Washington in many domains. Since the hypothesis of
this study asserts that Turkey has adopted an "independent" approach which puts its own interests
in the center of the policy actions, one must observe both cooperative and confrontational policies
depending on their service to national objectives. Therefore, delineation of several controversial
historical incidents that links “ends” with “means” will be beneficial to clarify the analysis.
In the beginning, it is crucial to elaborate on the different views of the U.S. and Turkey
regarding the definition of stability in the region. One of the striking differences in how these two
allies perceive the region regarding the regime types of the existing states becomes evident in an
interview conducted by Stephan Kinzer in 2002, who asked then Turkish President Abdullah Gul
about Turkish policies that cause problematic relations between US and Turkey regarding the
developments in its close neighborhood. Gul stated that Turkey cannot change the geography and
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its neighbors. He also emphasized that while Ankara does not necessarily like the regimes of the
surrounding countries, it should not be afraid to have relations with them. Therefore, he stressed
the need for constant engagements with these states (Lutsky, 2002).
On the other hand, for the U.S., stabilizing the Middle East was equal to the establishment
of liberal markets, secure energy flows, protection for Israel, secure maritime routes, and
advancing norms of democracy. The issue of Iraq presents a good example of how the two
countries’ points of view differ. The American objective was to contain and topple the Saddam
regime in Iraq, which was a threat to Israel and neighboring countries. To achieve that objective,
it crippled central Iraqi government control and promoted Kurdish administration of northern Iraq,
policies which caused problems for Turkey in both the security (increased PKK attacks) and
economic (decreased trade with Bagdad) domains.
Moreover, in an attempt to contain Iran, America sold nearly $125 billion worth of
conventional arms to Middle Eastern countries, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. This increased militarization was not consistent with Turkey's regional vision of
stability. Indeed, for the USA and Turkey, Iran has always been a significant source of concern for
regional stability. Both states see benefits from limiting Iran’s expanding sphere of influence in
the broader Middle East and preventing it from becoming the epicenter of the Shiite population
(Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). Although Turkey competes with Iran for influence in Syria, Lebanon,
Gaza, and Iraq (Ozel, 2012), Turkey believes that regime change in the region should not include
military intervention or cause misery for millions that instigate mass population movements. Also,
pressure that can destabilize Iran might create ungoverned places, where the Iranian branch of the
PKK could find safe zones to direct attacks on Turkey.
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Moreover, Ankara maintains that threatening these governments and their authoritarian
regimes makes them more dangerous. From the perspective of Turkish officials, Iran's nuclear
program is in part a result of American threats against the establishment in Tehran. The resolutions
of the problems posed by authoritarian regimes like those in Syria and Iran, therefore, should be
conducted through diplomacy, trade, and political engagements.
While Ankara has as much disdain for the Iranian and Syrian regimes as does the U.S.,
Turkey opposed the isolation policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. In 2010, Turkey
tried to prevent another U.S. attempt to isolate Iran. Together with Brazil, Turkey reached an
agreement which was the first of its kind regarding the Iran nuclear issue. Turkey's arrangements
with Iran and Ankara's constructive approach to the nuclear issue were received cynically by the
U.S. as an Iranian attempt to buy time. Turkish-U.S. relations suffered a significant blow when
Ankara voted "no" on the resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that would
impose another round of UN sanction on Iran (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). From Ankara's
perspective, the attempt to isolate Iran would harm bilateral trade relations12 (Tezcur & Grigorescu,
2014).
Recently, the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-imposition of
tight unilateral sanctions, which are aimed at destabilizing the regime, have been strongly opposed
by Ankara. Many Turkish officials vocally declared that Ankara would not abide by the sanctions.
Besides the concerns mentioned above, especially after the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has become
more anxious about any potential turmoil in Iran, which can destabilize the country and cause
significant refugee and security issues for Turkey.

12

Turkey was concerned that the upcoming isolation could prevent transborder cooperation against PKK, and foil
national energy security due to export restrictions (Tezcur & Grigorescu, 2014). According to Tezcur and Grigorescu,
in 2010, the percentage of Turkish exports that went to Iran was 2.67%, while 6.41% of Turkish imports came from
Iran.
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In Syria, relations between two allies collided even more volatilely. Turkey had difficult
relations with Damascus until the end of 1998, when Hafez al-Assad agreed to end its support for
the PKK and expel its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. After the conclusion of the Adana agreement in
1998, bilateral relations stabilized. However, the United States enthusiastically campaigned for the
isolation of Syria and openly tried to dissuade Turkey from seeking a rapprochement with
Damascus. Philip Robins maintains that Turkey was unwilling to endanger the hard-won
improvement in bilateral relations and despite U.S. pressure it continued to support the Assad
regime (Robins, 2007). Even after the murder of Lebanese leader Hariri, for which substantial
evidence was found indicating the Syrian government's involvement, Turkey defied the USA by
continuing to engage with Syria. Ankara believed that maintaining good relations with Syria might
produce more leverage on the Baathist regime (Ozel, 2012).
Turkey's willingness to integrate with the Middle East created even more severe tension
when Turkish-Israel relations worsened. The first problem that stood on the way of integration
was the hostility of Arab nations towards Turkey’s relationship with Israel. Israel-Turkish relations
were established in 1949 when Ankara officially recognized the formation of the Jewish state.
Ankara developed friendly economic and diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. However, the Arabs’
distaste for Israel was a major obstacle to Turkey's relations with the Arab states (Litsas, 2014).
Israeli-Turkish relations got even closer in the second half of the 1990s when both sides
began to conduct military exercises to deal with their common arrogant neighbor, Syria (Erdurmaz,
2013). Also, Freedman argues that in the '90s good relations with Israel were beneficial for Ankara
to counter increasing pressure from the Armenian and Greek lobbies in the U.S. (Freedman, 2010).
Relations between Turkey and Israel became even warmer when the U.S. began to channel Turkish
arms purchases to Tel Aviv. The amiable interactions proceeded untouched during the first period
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of the JDP government; for example, during that time Turkish leaders strongly condemned the
statements of Ahmadinejad, who was announcing that “Israel should be wiped off of the map”
(Onis, 2011).
Ankara desires a peaceful regional order, and that depends on political stability and
economic integration. According to Altunisik, for Turkey, achieving peace between Arabs and
Israel was the precondition of economic integration and political stability. She maintains that
“Ankara operates on the assumption that Israel's current policies are blocking this path of regional
integration” (Altunisik, Meliha Benli, 2013). Accepting that one of the reasons for U.S.
involvement in the Middle East was to secure Israel, Turkey has also linked the centrality of MEPP
with the U.S. stance against Iran and other “rogue states” (Ulgul, 2017). For example, on 2 October
2006, after an Oval Office meeting in Washington, Prime Minister Erdogan stated: “Today
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a major factor in the rise of regional and global tensions. In order to
establish peace in the Middle East and in the world, a permanent and fair solution to this problem
must first be found primarily.”(Kanat et al., 2017).
Thus, in 2008 Turkey ramped up diplomatic efforts to mediate the Israel-Syria conflict.
Mending relations between the Jews and the Arabs, which were a primary obstacle standing in the
way of Turkey's further integration with the region, was the initial choice of Turkey. The
announcement regarding the peace talks came on May 21st, 2008, when the U.S. was trying to
isolate Syria. The negotiations appropriately advanced and the signing of a peace agreement was
expected during Ehud Barak’s visit to Istanbul. However, the process abruptly ended when Israel
broke the negotiated ceasefire and launched a full ground invasion of the Gaza Strip at the end of
the year (Kanat et al., 2017).
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Recognizing the difficulties of mediating such a complex issue, Turkey has chosen to
distance itself from Israel. Some analysts have asserted this change is an ideological choice and
have attributed it to the Islamist JDP government's anti-Semitic sentiments. However, the way
relations later unfolded hints of clear political choices behind this strategy.
The first sign of this change emerged during the Davos World Economic Forum in 2009
when Mr. Erdogan vocal criticism against Israeli actions during the Gaza War widely echoed in
international media. Many scholars believe that after the Davos incident, Turkey openly shifted to
favoring the Palestinian cause, putting at risk long-entrenched bilateral economic, diplomatic and
security relations with Israel (Oguzlu, 2010). Indeed, the cost was high, but the benefit appeared
to be bigger. The "one-minute" objection of Erdogan against the double standard of the moderator,
who was trying to avoid Erdogan's critics by limited his speech time went viral throughout the
Middle East. Immediately after the 2009 Davos forum, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan enjoyed
the popularity of a rock star among the Arab populations, who resented their own leaders' failure
to take a firm stance against Israel. Iranians and Arabs could hardly believe that a Turkish leader
of a secular Muslim state is acting more radically toward Tel Aviv than any of his Muslim
counterparts. The incident instantly flushed away the centuries long Turkish-Arab mistrust
(Steinvorth, 2009).
Previously, when Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council Election, Turkey
accepted the demand of Hamas for a meeting. This incident was widely interpreted as evidence of
the rise of an Islamist Turkish foreign policy. However, the nature of the meeting and messages to
Hamas reveal Turkey's endeavors to integrate into the region. Turkey has expressed many times
the fact that Hamas is part of the solution to the Palestinian issue and that, without Hamas
involvement, prospects for peace are very thin. In one of the public meetings, Erdogan explained
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how the visit had occurred. He said that they had presented two options to Hamas leaders. If they
received official assignments, they would be welcomed as state officials. If not, then they would
be accepted as the guests of the JDP (Sabah, 2006). During the meeting the JDP officials urged
Hamas to immediately recognize Israel, cease the terrorist attacks, seek a two-state solution, and
accept the previously signed agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel (Oguzlu,
2008). However, Turkey’s close position to Hamas strained relations between the U.S. and Ankara,
especially after Erdogan dubbed the Israeli operation that killed the Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin
an act of “State Terrorism” (Freedman, 2010).
Next, the Gaza war and the subsequent naval blockade of the Gaza Strip led to the May
2010 Marmara flotilla incident, which changed the course of relations significantly. Turkey was
against the blanket blockade that was prohibiting any goods from reaching Gaza, ostensibly to
prevent the flow of arms. The flotilla intended to highlight the blockade by delivering humanitarian
aid. However, it encountered aggressive intervention from Israeli commandos, which killed nine
activists including one U.S.-Turkish dual citizen. Turkey reacted strongly and cut its diplomatic
relations with Israel.
Although U.S. mediation succeeded in restoring Turkey-Israel relations in 2013, the stance
of Turkey on the Middle East Peace Process and against Israel has not changed. By acquiring a
reputation as an ardent supporter of Palestine, Turkey has achieved its objective of integration with
the Arab world in the Middle East. Turkish TV serials have achieved wide popularity, many
political entities have begun to emulate the JDP as a model, Turkish firms obtained a friendly
business environment, and Arab columnists praise Turkey's way of acting against perceived
injustices against the Muslim Palestinian population. Thus, the popularity of Turkey, an
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exceptional country with a Muslim population, a democratically elected Islamic government and
a discernably rising GDP, has significantly increased in the region.
Since the flotilla episode, Turkey has deliberately distanced itself from Israel and has made
an effort to maintain its newly acquired status in the Middle East, regardless of U.S. concerns about
hostile relations with Israel. Therefore, poor relations between Turkey and Israel have had the
effect of worsening engagements between Ankara and Washington (Cook, 2011).
Since the flotilla incident Turkey has continued to positioned itself as a supporter of the
Palestinian cause, furthering its integration with the Arab world and thus serving its national
interests. For example, the U.S. voted against the 2010 draft UN resolution13 that was strongly
supported by Turkey that accused Israel of violating international humanitarian law and human
rights law (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013). President Erdogan also criticized the November 2012 Gaza
operations of Israel as well as the U.S. for supporting Tel Aviv after the attacks. He disapproved
of the “no” vote cast by the U.S. on the resolution to upgrade the status of the Palestinian Authority
to “non-member observer state.”. He stated: "You were the ones who wanted a two-state solution.
Now, why do you stand against Palestine as a state? I cannot understand that.” (Altunisik, 2013).
Similarly, after Trump's decision to move the American embassy to Jerusalem, Turkey
strongly condemned the move and Tel Aviv for "committing a massacre" against the Palestinian
protestors. Moreover, Turkey, as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) term president,
initiated an extraordinary summit in Istanbul to protest the U.S. decision, which was in violation
of the relevant UNSC resolutions (Anadolu Agency, 2017). Turkey led the biggest Muslim body
to act against the move of the embassy and condemn the U.S. decision. Also, Turkey was the most

13

Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships
Carrying Humanitarian Assistance,” Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly 15th Session, A/HRC/15/21,
September 27, 2010.
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active state in lobbying the UN to act against the decision and condemn the U.S. action, which is
against the law "to alter the character and status" of the city before the peace process has concluded
(Dwyer, 2017).
As Israel's security is one of the most vital interests of Washington, Ankara’s stance, which
is unfavorable to Israel, strained Turkey's relations with the unipole. Since the problem could not
be solved through mediation, as part of assuming active diplomacy, despite facing criticism,
Turkey prioritized its national interest. It is essential to express the fact that despite harsh rhetoric,
Turkey supports Israel's right to exist, the goal of a two-state solution and a negotiation process
for peace (United States Congress, House, CFA, 2010). Turkey's objection to Israel has never
turned into opposing its presence in the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey rarely announces arguments
that are not shared by European states. However, the high-pitch manifestation and Turkey's
influence on the population of other regional nations distinguishes the dose of criticism.
Therefore, it is hard to claim that the ideological elements of the government drive Turkey's
behaviors. The Turkish public is very sympathetic to Palestinian cause and Israel has been seen as
an oppressor state since the beginning of the “Intifada.” At the same time, Turkish views of the
U.S., which hardly fulfills the image of an honest broker on the issue, are very negative (Quandt,
2011). Under these conditions, no government can change its stance toward Tel Aviv. Besides the
JDP government, many other Turkish leaders and opposition parties continuously denounce Israeli
activities. Many other countries, including the EU members that are the closest allies of
Washington, disagree with American policy on Israel and share Turkish concerns. Having strained
relations with Israel is not the objective of Turkey. After the unsuccessful attempt to normalize
Israel with the regional states, it has become an instrument for the country's regional integration.
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Despite the opposition because of the difference in views, Turkey has also cooperated with
the U.S. on broader Middle East policies aimed at stabilizing the region. Turkey's opening in the
Middle East cultivated good results in the first decade of the 21st century. During that time, it has
increased its economic prestige in the region by becoming the world's 14th largest economy and
its cultural impact through widely broadcast Turkish TV serials. In addition, Turkish democratic
experience was unique among the nations in the area of Broader Middle East and North Africa
(BMENA), and Ankara disseminated a liberal agenda.
Therefore, the Turkish government's effort was highly complementary to Washington's
moderation and democratization endeavors. Also known as the Greater ME project, Turkey had a
vital role in this effort due to its strategic and geographical location. Turkey, a secular Muslim
state, was considered by the USA to be a "model" for ME countries (Dagci, 2015). For example,
during her time as National Security Adviser in the Bush Administration, Condoleezza Rice wrote
an article in which she noted the political/economic transformation of 22 countries through
freedom, democracy, tolerance, and welfare (Dagci, 2015).
For the U.S., Turkey was a major soft power contributor, which has provided a broader
legitimacy to Washington in its war against terrorism. Since 2002, Ankara has had an implicit
agenda that has promoted Islam as a religion compatible with democracy. This was complementary
to the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) that aimed to “strengthen
cooperation with the governments, business and civil society of the region, in order to strengthen
freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all” (Dagci, 2015). Having been presented by the Bush
administration in June 2004 during the G-8 meeting, the BMENA Initiative emerged as a method
to fight extremism and radicalism by promoting moderation and democratization (Hale, 2013).
The Bush administration promoted Turkey as a model to the Arabs and the Islamic world. As a
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democratic and pro-Western Muslim country, Ankara was a useful example in refuting the
fallacies that Islam and democracy are incompatible and that all Muslims are anti-Western. In this
respect, Ankara was the primary supporter of Washington’s efforts (Hale, 2013)
From the Turkish perspective, being endorsed as a model country by the U.S. was a
significant opportunity to integrate with the region. Due to the JDP's economic and political
success in Turkey, some political parties in Arab states had already begun to emulate its system.
Before the Arab Spring began, Turkey's JDP had already been invited by many regional political
entities to share their experience and organizational knowledge (Yesilyurt, 2017). The receptive
environment for Turkey's political system was because Islamist parties were the most organized
political entities with robust, large and conservative constituencies (Hamid, 2017).
Moreover, during the Bush administration, in Iraq, Turkey’s efforts to integrate the Sunnis
into the political process and ability to speak with all the Iraqi Arabs, as well as Ankara’s
constructive initiatives for mediation, gained the genuine appreciation of all parties (Ozel, 2012).
In addition, in order to counter Saudi and Iranian influence, the Obama Administration
contemplated Turkey playing the role of stabilizing power after the U.S. withdrawal. Ankara's
vested interest in a stable Iraqi government and willingness to improve relations with every party
(Shia, Sunni, and Kurds) constituted a crucial part of the post-withdrawal U.S. strategy (Altunisik,
2013).
During Obama's presidency, relations between the U.S. and Turkey evolved from a
"strategic partnership" to a "model partnership." Dagci maintains that while the first denotes two
states acting together against a common threat, “model partnership" describes a mutually agreed
upon framework and a collective will to rehabilitate the region in which the USA and Turkey
would intensify their partnership (Dagci, 2015).
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The eruption in late 2010 of the Arab uprising in Tunisia and its spread to other Arab
countries was a serious threat to stability. Therefore, according to the new Turkish foreign policy
approach, the outcomes of the Arab uprising needed to be controlled, which furthered cooperation
between Turkey and the USA in the Middle East. Both Turkey and the USA adopted a position of
supporting the transformations in the region. Again, as a secular and democratic Muslim state,
Turkey served as a perfect model for the post-revolutionary Arab states. Furthermore, in parallel
with Washington’s stance, Ankara displayed more support for popular movements than autocratic
regimes (Cagrı & Sivis, 2017). The collapse of once-stable Arab authoritarian regimes and threats
to the stability of the region had incentivized Turkey to adopt an active approach to re-establish or
influence the outcome of the uprisings in hopes of securing a friendlier environment.
The U.S. and Turkey cooperated in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, with some nuances. Here
again, there is a need to point out that Turkey’s first preference has been maintaining stability in
its region and that it has chosen to act only after it has become clear that restoring the previous
order is impossible. At the initial stage of the conflict in Libya, Turkey was against NATO's
involvement and remained in contact with the Qaddafi regime. It made a priority of securing the
lives and safety of Turkish citizens while insisting that Gaddafi peacefully meet the demands of
the Libyan people. Only after Turkey was convinced that Gaddafi's attitude would not change did
it sever relations and became supportive of military intervention (Bagci & Erdurmaz, 2017).
In Syria, in contrast to the U.S. administration, which desired a change in regime and
immediately supported the opposition, Turkey tried to convince Assad to accept a democratic
solution. Erdogan continued to engage with Bashar al-Assad until he openly ignored Turkish pleas
to accept reforms and stop killing Syrian citizens. After eight months of ardent diplomatic efforts,
Ankara finally adopted a position parallel with Washington’s when negotiations had failed to
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persuade the Assad regime to accommodate the demands of the people (Ozel, 2012). In the end,
the U.S. and Turkey agreed to act together against Assad. They condemned Damascus and worked
to organize the opposition. However, due to the U.S. upcoming election, Washington’s attention
wavered, and the two countries’ methods in dealing with the Syrian issue diverged (Cagrı & Sivis,
2017).
Relations between Ankara and Washington were positive when a boost in soft power was
useful to the U.S. Due to the JDP’s foreign policy; Turkey was very popular among the Arab
population. The Turkish government's Islamic orientation provided links with grassroots religious
movements in the region and Turkey was perceived by the U.S. as a useful element that helped to
keep the desired transformation manageable (Hale, 2013).
Defusing security risks. Currently, the security risks faced by Turkey can be categorized
as (1) the internal and cross border threat posed by PKK (Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan: Kurdistan
Working Party) terrorism, (2) the activities of violent extremist organizations, (3) the refugee
crisis, (4) the Gulenist terror movement (FETO: Gulenist Terror Organization), and (5) threats to
territorial integrity. While Turkey frequently cooperated with the U.S. in coping with the
challenges posed by terrorism, the two states remain at odds due to spillover effects of
Washington's policies. Indeed, this fact is the primary cause of Turkey’s divergent policy
adaptation.
PKK terrorism, which has the potential to instigate internal instability and endanger
territorial integrity through its link across the border, is the most critical security issue facing
Turkey. Indeed, one of the most converging elements of cooperation in foreign policy between the
U.S. and Turkey has been the fight against terrorism. Since the 1980s, Turkey has been threatened
by terrorism caused by the PKK, which began its activities as a Kurdish secessionist movement.
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Besides its effects on Turkey’s society and economy, Turkey has suffered 40,000 dead during the
fight. PKK is an organization that directly endangers Turkey's territorial integrity and its good
relations with its neighbors (especially Iraq and Syria).
Moreover, the PKK’s ideology is a significant threat to the social integration of Turkey,
because it directly targets the traditional commonalities between Turks and Kurds. The PKK’s
strategy has been to launch attacks on powerful landlords/tribes and their oppressive
implementations of tribalism. The PKK's promotion of leftist ideology and egalitarianism has
inspired a reactionary counter-traditionalist opposition against the conservative lifestyle (Yüce
1999). Initially, PKK's ideology was based on socialism, but evolved in the last 30 years into
hostility to universalist values. As it evolved, the ideology of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan
abandoned most of its leftist values and embraced ethnicity-based ideals, which transformed the
organization into one devoted to ethnic socialism (Komecoglu, 2012) and a separatist ideology.
Even though their relations could be volatile, Turkey and the U.S. were mostly supportive
of each other. For example, after Ocalan was expelled from Syria in 1998, he subsequently ended
up in Turkey with the help of American intelligence services in Afrika. For its part, Turkey has
provided military support, financial tracking of suspected terrorist networks, and contributed
substantial military participation to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that
operates in Afghanistan.
However, U.S.-Turkish relations regarding the fight against terrorism have had ups and
downs. While the U.S. was always supportive rhetorically, its action, especially against PKK bases
inside Iraq, was very limited. Therefore, Turkey conducted cross-border operations into Iraqi
territory. In 2007, facing the prospect of another unilateral Turkish Armed Forces cross-border
military operation, the Bush Administration agreed to provide Turkey “real time” intelligence on
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the Iraqi-based PKK (Hale, 2013). Ozel maintains that the Bush administration's 5 November 2007
announcement that declared “the PKK as the enemy of Iraq, Turkey and the U.S” and the
subsequent decision to provide actionable intelligence was also aimed at improving Ankara's
relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In addition, Americans supported the
trilateral consultation structure among Turkey, Iraq and the U.S. to deal with the PKK issue (Ozel,
2012)
While there are many examples of the U.S. and Turkish governments working together,
when American actions have begun to endanger the stability of the adjacent states and jeopardizing
territorial integrity, Ankara has preferred to confront Washington.
At the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, U.S.-Turkey relations remained frayed
because Ankara insisted on maintaining contact with the Assad regime, while the U.S. favored
intervention. After Ankara finally adopted a parallel position with Washington the two allies
diverged again when Islamist movements dominated the Syrian opposition. Consequently, the
initial cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. began to diminish and completely ended in 2017,
after the Trump administration’s announcement that the U.S. was ending support for the groups
fighting the Syrian Civil War (Itani, 2017) . Relations deteriorated further to an historical low
when the U.S. decided to fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) by supporting the leftist Kurdish
group PYD/YPG, the offshoot of the PKK in Syria, which caused havoc in Turkey (Harris, 2015).
Background to Turkey’s Fiercest Ever Opposition to U.S. Policy. Without knowing the
significance of PKK activities and their influence on Turkish society, it is hard to understand
Turkey's fierce opposition against the U.S. policies and relation with PYD/YPG in Syria. The
current complex relations of Ankara with different Kurdish groups is closely related to the
evolution of their ideologies and the methods they prefer to apply.
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Historically, a perception of exclusion created dissatisfaction that has motivated the
emergence of Kurdish political and armed movements. Over time, the methods and the objectives
of this activism have changed significantly. While in the 1970s, aspirations for an "independent
Kurdish nation-state" were circulated(Galip, 2015) during and after the Gulf War a concept of
"gradual and structured separation" has been espoused(Kaya & Whiting, 2017). The theory of how
a future independent Kurdish state should be constituted recently evolved into an unusual form in
Syria with the introduction of "Democratic Confederalism," a system that was formulated by
Abdullah Ocalan and has begun to be implemented by the PYD (PYD: Partîya Yekîtî ya Dêmokrat;
or Democratic Union Party) in the north of Syria(Sary, 2016).
Syria contains a tiny proportion of Kurds which is disconnected from the greater Kurdish
community by national borders. Their politicization has occurred through intra-Kurdish rivalries
which manifest themselves in competition for influence by forming affiliations and branches in
neighboring states. Therefore, for the greater Kurdish community, Syria can be characterized as
an area where rivalries for influence are played out mainly between leftists (PKK sympathizers)
and traditionalists (who favoring KDP) (Kaya & Whiting, 2017). Each movement has tried to form
transnational connections, which were useful in mobilizing Syrian Kurds as human resources for
their competing movements in Iraq and Turkey. In the1970s and1980s, hundreds of Syrian Kurds
were recruited mainly by KDP as Peshmerga. It is estimated that up to 10,000 Syrian Kurds were
killed as PKK militants in Turkey in the '80s and ‘90s (Tejel, 2008).
Coming into existence in 2003 as an outcome of intra-Kurdish rivalries, PYD owes its
current success mostly to being an offshoot of the PKK, which has been one of the most significant
actors since the beginning of the Kurdish movements in Syria. Because of water problems and
territorial disputes with Turkey, the Syrian government considered the existence of the PKK an
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advantage against its neighbor(Tejel, 2008). After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, Syria
offered refuge to the PKK leadership as part of a balancing strategy against Turkey(Schott, 2017).
The PKK was allowed to open political offices in many cities in Syria, and enjoyed the privilege
of being the only Kurdish political movement permitted to openly operate in that country. Except
for the PKK, the regime banned all other Kurdish movements and prosecuted their crucial
personnel (Self & Ferris, 2016). During this period, the PKK was very cautious to direct all its
activities toward Turkey and to not upset its host nation.
In 1998, the Turkish state openly threatened the Syrian government over its support of the
PKK and forced the Syrian state to expel Ocalan. Intimidated by threats from Turkey, the Syrian
regime cracked down on PKK remnants, and banned PKK activities. However, the existence of
other local leftist Kurdish movements like the Yekîtî (Union) party, which began to fill the power
vacuum, stimulated PKK to restore local support in Syria. In 2003, the clandestine Democratic
Union Party (PYD: Partîya Yekîtî ya Dêmokrat) was established as a successor to the Syrian part
of the PKK. PYD joined other Kurdish movements to confront the Syrian regime's exclusionist
policies.
Just a year after the founding of the PYD, in 2004, a football match in Qamishlo escalated
into a Kurdish revolt against the regime, which lasted for 13 days and resulted in 43 deaths. The
event sparked vigorous opposition to the Assad regime among Syrian Kurds, politicizing the ethnic
community and creating a relatively unified front for Kurdish identity. The Yekîtî party and the
PYD inspired the resistance and stood out as prominent leaders of the Kurdish movement in Syria
(Allsopp & Harriet, 2016).
Another historical incident that led to the consolidation of PYD power in Syria was the
start of the Syrian Civil War, which began as a part of the Arab Spring in March 2011. At the
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beginning of the Civil War, the Kurds were trying to figure out what their stance should be towards
the conflict. Some of the Kurds, including PYD, were suspicious about the Arab opposition
movement, which was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a group that did not favor
Kurdish political activities. Thus, there was a debate about whether to act together with the Arabs
or maintain distance from their activities.
Arabs had already founded the Syrian National Council (SNC) in 2011, an umbrella group
comprised of Syrian opposition parties based in Istanbul. Masoud Barzani, the president of the
Kurdish Region in northern Iraq, strongly backed the Syrian opposition, in alliance with Turkey.
He urged his party's Syrian branch (KDP-S) members to host meetings to unite Kurds under one
umbrella to fight against the Assad regime. In October 2011, with the support of the Iraqi Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG), the Kurdish National Council (KNC), comprised of Syrian Kurdish
parties, was established to oppose Assad(Schott, 2017).
Meanwhile, the Syrian regime, in an attempt to exploit the lack of unity among the
opposition and draw the Kurds closer, announced new edicts that met some of the traditional
Kurdish demands. Consequently, pressure on the Kurds was relieved, which provided them with
the opportunity to expand their activities. This move of the Syrian Assad regime managed to
increase the fault lines between the Kurds and Arabs in the country (Allsopp & Harriet, 2016).
Strongly influenced by leftist ideology, PYD separated itself from the opposition to Assad
and pursued a different agenda. It had already taken control of the predominantly Kurdish areas in
August 2012 when government forces had withdrawn from the mostly Kurdish populated areas in
order to consolidate their hold on more strategically valuable areas. PYD withdrew from the KNC
and closely affiliated itself with PKK ideology. Salih Muslim, the head of the party, declared that
they did not only want a regime change but a system change. Asya Abdullah, the co-president of
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the PYD, offered “the third line," an agenda centered on self-defense and the primacy of nonviolent solutions. She clarified this strategy by saying: "The third line is an independent and open
track, which does not support either the regime or the opposition… The third line is based on the
organization of society and the formation of cultural, social, economic and political institutions in
order to achieve the people's self-administration…”(Sary, 2016).
In 2013, the PYD began to govern territories under its control by creating The Movement
for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM: Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk). This organization was a
coalition of civic associations and political parties (Balanche, 2018) founded by cadres previously
active in the PKK and later in its sister-party, the PYD (Jongerden & Knapp, 2016). In 2013, TEVDEM announced the creation of an autonomous administration named "Rojava," which comprised
three cantons, Cizire, Kobane, and Afrin. These cantons were supposed to be governed by an
elected assembly that controls Rojava's executive bureau. Each canton had a Kurdish prime
minister aided by two vice prime ministers, who are non-Kurdish (Balanche, 2018).
The looming threat of ISIS made the PYD even more attractive to the locals; In the absence
of Syrian government forces, the PYD was the only political entity in the area with any significant
military power. The People's Protection Units (YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), the armed branch
of the PYD, was formed after the Qamishlo Revolt in 2004 with the backing of the
PKK(globalsecurity.org, 2018). Through the YPG, PYD effectively offered protection from ISIS
to the people in Northern Syria, which decisively sidelined the KNC. As a result, the PYD
outmaneuvered all other Kurdish factions and unilaterally declared autonomy(Schott, 2017).
The emergence of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and its spread in Syria was a
decisive factor that provided PYD to consolidate its authority. Its indiscriminate and savage attacks
made ISIS an enemy of the international community as well as of the Kurds, and the PYD’s
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willingness to fight against ISIS made them a legitimate member of the U.S.-led international
coalition that was formed to fight against the Islamic State. In October 2015, the PYD was
integrated into a new alliance consisting of Arab, Assyrian/Syrian, and a few other ethnic group
forces. In December 2016, U.S. officials announced that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
consisted of 45,000 fighters including more than 13,000 Arab fighters; the group, however, was
dominated by the YPG and relied on it for logistics and veteran fighters (militaryperiscope.com,
2017). The material and monetary support of the coalition expanded the PYD’s influence and
brought additional territories under Kurdish control.
For Ankara, the expansion of PYD rule was unacceptable because, unlike the Iraqi Kurds,
who had good relations with Turkey, PYD followed the same ideology of Ocalan as the PKK. For
example, KDP's system is closer to the "Middle Eastern state model where authoritarianism, a
centralized state, and tribal and economic elites are interlinked with the political elite" (Kaya &
Whiting, 2017). With the emergence of the PYD in Syria, the Rojava experience that is based on
alienating populations from their traditional bonds and getting rid of commonalities could amplify
the appeal of the PKK's ideology among Kurds and carve an assertive space that can increase
polarization in the border areas.
Turkey grew even warier of the PYD because the failure of negotiations with the PKK was
closely related to the Syrian Kurds’ new recognition in the international arena. In 2009, official
peace talks between Turkey and PKK began under the name of "democratic opening" or "peace
process"(Oney & Selck, 2017). For the first time in the history of the Republic, the Turkish
government was abandoning the policy of categorical denial of Kurdish rights and open to granting
linguistic and cultural rights to Kurds(Gunes & Gurses, 2017). However, Kurdish elites claimed
that their political demands had not been met and that all the rights offered them were merely
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cosmetic. During the talks, the Kurdish battle for Kobane against ISIS, which united all Kurds and
formed a very distinctive identity that had never been seen before among the Kurdish community,
took place. Having exited from the emerging opportunities in Syria, the PKK broke the peace and
initiated armed conflict in urban and rural areas inside Turkey and Iraq.
In order to seize the newly emergent opportunity, the PKK leadership and fighters went to
Syria to organize PYD and enlarge the capacity of YPG. Hundreds of PKK militia members
crossed the Iraqi border to become the core of the YPG units (Self & Ferris, 2016). After clearing
the region of ISIS fighters, the PKK moved its Headquarters elements to Mount Sincar, which
stretches across both Syria and Iraq and provided covered access to and transport across the border.
Threatened by the organic collaboration between these organizations and PKK's attempts to
consolidate its presence in Syria, Turkey declared PYD/YPG an affiliate of PKK and began to
openly target them as terrorist organizations.
At the same time, the U.S. continued to accept the YPG-led SDF (Syrian Democratic
Forces) as local partners, claiming they were the best option to fight against ISIS, though U.S.
officials accepted that Turkey had a "legitimate concern." They had announced numerous times
that the PKK is a terrorist group, but had not made the same determination about the PYD/YPG
(Kheel, 2018). Also, they claimed that SDF was a force made up of many local groups, with Arabs
as the majority. In addition, The U.S. did not accept the Turkish proposal to use Turkish military
forces and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to liberate Rakka from ISIS elements. American insistence
on using the YPG as the primary forces of the U.S.-led coalition infuriated Turkey. Turkish
officials frequently expressed that they would "not let a terror corridor on along its border,"
criticized the method of "getting rid of one terror group with another" as a wrong choice
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(Yenisafak, 2016) . Moreover, Mr. Erdogan strongly stated that "Turkey will deal with the terror
threat of its own accord," signaling that the self-help approach was on the way.
After the liberation from ISIS of Menbic, an Arab town west of the Euphrates River, the
YPG was supposed to withdraw but refused to do so. Formerly, Turkey had announced that no
YPG forces would be tolerated west of the Euphrates River. That movement increased Turkish
distrust of the PYD's intentions, which were to unite the cantons and seek possibilities for a passage
to the sea. Turkey immediately launched two military operations to prevent this Kurdish aspiration
and hinder the PKK's further positioning in the north of Syria along its southern border. First,
Turkey launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" against ISIS and the YPG and entered as a wedge
between the Afrin and Kobane cantons. Secondly, by launching "Operation Olive Branch," Ankara
wrested control of Afrin canton from the PYD by force and threatened to do the same in Menbic,
if the U.S. failed to keep its earlier promise to leave the city.
These two operations were actively directed against elements for whom the U.S. had
repeatedly expressed full support. Sometimes Turkey operated very close to the U.S. troops,
increasing fears of a possible confrontation. Moreover, Turkey began to actively participate in
mechanisms such as the Astana and Sochi processes that had been created together with Russia
and Iran in order to ease the tension of the war. Yet, Ankara also cooperated with the U.S. and
remained in close coordination with the Americans in Menbic. After Turkey increased its pressure
for resolving the Menbic issue, a mechanism known as the "Menbic Road Map" was created, which
entailed combined US-Turkish patrols and subsequent YPG withdrawal from the region.
Although the significance of the PYD/YPG threat to Turkey has never been appropriately
emphasized in the Western media, the stakes for Turkey were high. The U.S. decision to support
PYD as a partner in the region significantly tipped the balance of power in favor of the PKK/PYD,
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with many future implications for Turkey. Its ability to project power and economically sustain
forces across the border allowed Turkey to employ an independent approach, which conflicted
with the unipole's policy preferences but was useful in restoring, or at least preventing further
changes in, the regional balance of power.
Another example of Turkey’s independent approach and cooperation with the U.S. is the
early warning radar system established in Malatya. Although Turkey was upset with Washington
because, just a year before, the U.S. had rejected the Iranian nuclear deal (the Tehran Declaration)
negotiated by Turkey and Brazil and had insisted on imposing sanctions on Tehran, Ankara
decided to cooperate in the interest of stability. Despite suspicions that the radar's real purpose
was to detect Iranian missiles, Turkey forwent its opposition regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis
and accepted the stationing of the system during the G-20 Summit in June 2010. The U.S. officials
hailed it as “probably the biggest strategic decision between the US and Turkey in the past 15 or
20 years.” (Altunisik, 2013).
The time of this agreement coincided with heated debates over Israel’s interception of the
Marmara Flotilla debates and U.S efforts to isolate Iran. Despite the absence of any perceived
threat posed by Tehran, involvement in a defense system against Iran was politically awkward.
However, Turkey cooperated in such an adversarial situation because the system was defensive
and did not have a direct impact on regional stability (Cakmak & Güneysu, 2013).
Another reason for tension between Turkey and the U.S. is the U.S.-based "Gulen
movement," which has organized several operations, including a failed military coup, against the
JDP government. Washington has not met Turkey's demand to hand Fethullah Gulen over to
Turkish authorities. Perceiving the organization as a serious threat to the political establishment,
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Turkey has declared Fetullah Gulen’s movement to be a terrorist organization and purged
thousands of government employees who were related to the movement (Cagrı & Sivis, 2017).
During the sweeping crackdown in 2016, Turkish authorities arrested American citizen
Andrew Brunson, an evangelist pastor at a church located in Izmir, accusing him of being a spy
working for the Pennsylvania-based Gulen and of having links to the PKK (Nugent, 2018). Many
believed that Brunson was a card to realize a swap with Gulen. When the evangelist community,
Vice President Mike Pence and President Trump get involved in the issue, there were already
myriad disputes between two countries over issues ranging from U.S. support for the YPG and the
detention of a Halk Bank manager by the U.S. for allegedly circumventing the Iran sanctions to
Turkey's willingness to buy the S-400 Air Defense System from Russia and possible limitation of
selling the F-35 fighter jet program.
Turkey did not immediately meet U.S. demands that Brunson be freed. Subsequently, on
July 26, 2018, Vice President Pence tweeted a warning that the U.S. was prepared to levy
significant sanctions if the pastor was not released. On August 1, 2018 the U.S. Department of the
Treasury announced sanctions against Turkey's Minister of Justice Abdulhamit Gul and Minister
of Interior Suleyman Soylu, because of their allegedly leading roles in the detention of Brunson
(U.S. Department of The Treasury, 2018). Moreover, the U.S. imposed tariffs on imports of
Turkish aluminum and steel, creating an unprecedented currency crisis. On August 10, 2018, Mr.
Trump's Tweet: "I have just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect
to Turkey as their currency, the Turkish Lira, slides rapidly downward against our very strong
Dollar! Aluminum will now be 20% and Steel 50%. Our relations with Turkey are not good at this
time!" caused a tremendous loss of value to the Turkish lira--on August 11, 2018, the lira had lost
57% since the beginning of the year (BBC, 2018).
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The currency crisis, increased inflation and the negative outlook of the Turkish economy
significantly raised the cost to Turkey of resisting U.S. demands on this issue. Turkey released
Brunson after a trial that sentenced him to three years in prison. However, considering the over
one year of time he had spent in custody since 2016, he was released.
The Brunson incident provides a clear piece of evidence from a different perspective that
supports the theory that Turkey has pursued independent politics to maximize its objectives when
its national power could afford the cost; but cannot follow the independent approach, even
concerning issues related to a primary internal threat, when its material capability is restrained. In
the Brunson case, the potentially devastating effect of sanctions quickly forced Turkey to abide by
the American demands.
Similarly, after the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from Syria at the end of
2018, a possible attack by the Turkish military on the YPG/PYD became a central question in the
U.S. After the announcement, to clarify the U.S. position and ensure that withdrawal would not
affect its commitments to its allies, officials including National Security Adviser John Bolton paid
visits to several regional capitals. During Bolton’s Israel visit, he held a press conference with
Netanyahu, where he stated that the withdrawal was conditioned on Turkey’s promise not to attack
YPG/PYD Kurds in Syria.
On 8 January 2019, during a speech in Parliament, Erdogan publicly lashed out: “Bolton’s
remarks in Israel are not acceptable. It is not possible for me to swallow this. Bolton made a serious
mistake. If he thinks that way, he is in a big mistake. We will not compromise." During the
televised speech to lawmakers in his party, he continued his remarks by saying that all the
preparations to neutralize (the U.S. allied) YPG/PYD were complete and those who take part in
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the terror corridor along Turkey's southern borders were going to receive an appropriate response.
(Bianca Britton, Isil Sariyuce, Nicole Gaouette, & Kevin Liptak, 2019).
Yet, on January 13, 2019, after a tweet from Mr. Trump stating: “Starting the long overdue
pullout from Syria while hitting the little remaining ISIS territorial caliphate hard, and from many
directions. Will attack again from the existing nearby base if it reforms. Will devastate Turkey
economically if they hit Kurds. Create a 20-mile safe zone...", Turkey immediately accepted the
creation of a safe zone. While Turkey had already offered this option to protect refugees at the
beginning of the Civil War, its functionality is dubious at this stage. Besides, it is evident that the
creation of a safe zone is aimed at protecting YPG/PYD rather than providing comfort to Turkey's
security concerns. Yet, due to the vulnerability of its economic situation, Turkey has lost its ability
to pursue an independent politics and has entered a phase of reconsidering its strategy to achieve
its objectives.
These incidents further indicate that Turkish foreign policy behavior is structural. In order
to maximize its security, Turkey adopted an independent position, which entailed open
confrontation with the unipole; however, when it lacked the material capabilities to successfully
pursue an independent course, its behavior changed to a more submissive position.
Achieve Economic Development. The instability in post-Saddam Iraq greatly intensified
Turkey's security concerns. Therefore, TFP has focused on stabilizing Iraq, which had become
important to Turkey’s economic interests. Before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq was a
significant trading partner for Turkey, but the war and the subsequent UN sanctions effectively
ended those bilateral commercial relations. Likewise, Turkish elites were primarily concerned that
any new tension between Iran and the United States might undermine their nation’s economic
interests. Naturally, Turkey has developed a reflex that has served to avoid a similar situation.
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By 2011, Turkey had improved its economic position, undertaken prestigious projects
and economically turned into a pole of attraction for its smaller neighbors and surrounding region
(Hale, 2013). Endeavoring to find markets for its manufacturing industry, Ankara increasingly has
begun to benefit from stability and open relations with the countries in the Middle East. Therefore,
policies contributive to stabilization of the region and free trade have inspired cooperation, while
U.S. activities which threaten stability have invited Turkish opposition.
Turkey's GDP increased through an outward-looking export-driven economic approach
which needs stable areas conducive for business. While previously Turkey has channeled its trade
to traditional Western markets, expanding into neglected markets has brought much growth,
investment, and new export markets in the Middle East and Eurasia (United States Congress,
House, CFA, 2010). This success came as a part of removing visa requirements, embedding large
business delegations into official state visits, and improving the image of Turkey.
Moreover, Turkey has intensively invested in efforts to improve relations in Africa. For
example, on January 9, 2019, during the opening of the embassy in South Africa, in his speech
Mr. Erdogan related that Turkeys has increased its diplomatic missions from 12 in 2002, to 41.
Also, he stated that 10-15 years ago, Turkey was visible only in specific regions and areas, while
the country today has the 6th most extensive diplomatic network in the world (Hurriyet, 2019).
Turkey has preferred to cooperate with the U.S. when economic gain or compensation of
economic loss is available. For example, Ankara extensively cooperated with the U.S. in Central
Asia, while Washington was supportive of Ankara (against Russia) in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline project, which was planned to carry Azerbaijani and Central Asian oil via Turkey to
Europe. Also, in 2003, Turkey agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in the Iraq War only after the
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military campaign had begun (and became irreversible) and Washington released direct monetary
support that could make good Turkish losses.
Moreover, being in the center of its politics, Ankara has improved and maintained good
relations with countries with whom the U.S. is in conflict. Two structural dynamics are essential
to defining this behavior. First, Turkey is surrounded by states that the U.S. wants to isolate or
whose political establishment the U.S. wants to transform. Second, the unipole has the power to
isolate Turkey by putting stress on its banking system and weakening confidence in the Turkish
economy if its conflictual stance surpasses the threshold of tolerance. Therefore, multidimensional economic and political relations, especially with those states that have completely
rejected U.S. dominance, increases the resilience of Turkey’s independent position. In addition,
such places as Sudan, Venezuela, and Iran are the most lucrative markets, since the volatility of
their regimes discourages many competitive Western companies from investing in them. Faced
with U.S. financial coercion, Turkey has a genuine interest in improving its economic ties with
those states in a similar position like Russia and Iran, which have also experienced currency crises
due to economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. (Lewitt, 2018). Moreover, Turkey imports nearly
all of its energy needs and seeks to balance its trade deficit with energy-exporting states.
Developing political and economic relations with these states provides a sound opportunity to
compensate for some part of the loss.
In conclusion, Turkey means to maximize its objectives are related to the need for
balancing security requirements and economic development. In accordance with the structural
pressures, when its economic condition is strong, Ankara pushes harder to maximize its security
through adopting an independent approach. Yet, it forgoes autonomy and becomes more receptive
to the unipole' s preferences when its objectives for development are at risk.
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Proving the Argument
This part of the study is intended to address whether Turkey really tries to be independent
or is instead moving away from the West. If Turkey has picked a side, then a systematic opposition
toward the U.S. policy preferences would be expected. On the other hand, if Turkey has opted to
be independent, instead of total replacement or rejection, both cooperation and confrontation
would be observed.

Methodology
First, the empirical research chronologically collated prominent incidents in the relations
between the U.S. and Turkey since the beginning of unipolar order in 1990. It added to a
comprehensive list the announcements after a presidential visit or sideline meetings; agreements,
minister or higher-level important messages that initiate, maintain or change any significant policy;
and military and economic activities such as agreements or sanctions.
The Turkish Yearbook Chronology of Turkish-American relations was the principal source
for the selected cases from 1990 to 2002 (Aydin et al., 2001). For the period 2002 to the end of
2017, The Almanac of US-Turkey Relations Under the AK Party served as the primary source
(Kanat et al., 2017). Incidents that occurred during 2018 were selected by the author through
scanning the press.
Secondly, through the examination of the literature, the most important categories that have
the most volume and impact on Turkish-American relations have been determined. By looking
from Turkey's perspective, events that have links to stability, economy, military cooperation,
territorial integrity, terrorism, being a model country, relations with Israel, internal political
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instabilities, and energy security have been classified and marked under categories of proper
context.
Finally, after fixing the occurrence rates, the data have been visualized by using charts.

Analysis
The study asserts that Turkey pursues independence to maximize the outcomes of its
objectives. Therefore, the empirical analysis needs to prove that:
(1) Turkey behaves independently rather than picking a side,
(2) The visibility of independent behavior correlates with growing national power,
(3) The presented objectives are coherent with Turkey’s foreign policy behaviors.
From a structural perspective, the material capability of a state is one of the primary
elements that affect its behavior. Therefore, the study accepts "2008" as a decisive point in the
analysis because of the discernable increase in the elements of Turkey's national power. Also, it
takes “2002” as a marking point for the beginning of JDP party rule in Turkey and compares its
behavior before and after 2008.
Table 7 depicts the overall results of important events in relations between Turkey and the
U.S. since the end of the Cold War. There is need to note that the time span between 1990-2018
depicts the total interactions since the beginning of the unipolarity. The 1990-2008 period is meant
to point out the era of low national power, while the time between 2008 and 2018 indicates the
increased capabilities. Finally, 2002-2008 depicts the era of JDP rule during the era of restricted
capabilities. The purpose of the table is to provide dataset for comparing the general tendency of
Turkey’s behavior under different structural conditions.
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Table 7. The American-Turkish Relations During the Unipolar Systemic Structure.

The American-Turkish Relations During the Unipolar Systemic Structure
Years

Cooperate

Oppose

Disagreement in Methods

TOTAL

1990-2018

73

43

5

119

1990-2008

47

13

0

57

2002-2008

13

4

0

24

2008-2018

29

30

5

67

Table 8 provides the results for cooperative policies between two allies in different
domains. The events with high occurrence rates show the importance of the subject for Turkey.
On the other hand, the time spans aim to compare different periods similar to previous table.

Table 8. The American-Turkish Cooperative Policies.

Improve Relation with Israel

Economic Loss

Degrade Territorial Integrity

Energy Politics

Threatening the Political
Establishment

Decrease Territorial Integrity

34

25

18

7

6

4

5

5

4

4

4

1990-2008

21

18

15

13

4

5

4

4

4

3

0

4

2002-2008

10

5

9

4

2

4

1

0

1

0

0

3

2008-2018

21

17

11

5

3

3

0

1

1

1

0

1

Model Country

39

Economic Gain

Military Cooperation

1990-2018

Counter Terrorism

Stabilize Region

Increase Territorial Integrity

Turkey's Cooperation with the U.S.

Years
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Finally, Table 9 classifies the findings of opposing policies between the U.S. and Turkey.
Table 9. Turkey's Opposing Policies to the U.S.

Improve Relation with Israel

Model Country

Increase Territorial Integrity

Economic Gain

11

9

6

6

3

2

2

1

2

1

1990-2008

5

2

3

4

3

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

2008-2018

14

9

8

5

3

6

2

1

2

1

2

0

2002-2008

2

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

Counter Terrorism

11

Stabilize the Region

Military Cooperation

18

Years

Oppose Israel in MEPP

Economic Loss

1990-2018

Destabilize the Region

Threatening the Political
Establishment

Degrade Territorial Integrity

Turkey's Opposition to the U.S.

Turkey’s behavior is independent, and it correlates with its growing national power.
The primary sign for being independent can be observed in the direction of the relations. If moving
toward one direction is the case, then a systematic rejection of the previous side should be detected.
On the other hand, if Turkey behaves independently within its national interest-centric view, the
engagement should vary situationally. In addition, since an increase in material capability is a
prerequisite to display some degree of independence in foreign policy; the change in behavior
should concur with the change in national power.
Between 1990 and 2008, when Turkey was accepted as a Western-centric country, the level
of cooperation is overwhelming, which shows an immense preference for siding with the U.S.
(Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Turkey-US Relations (1990-2008).

Between 2002 and 2008, when the current JDP was still in charge, the level of cooperation
and opposition changed by only two percent (Figure 7).
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Turkey- U.S. Relations (2002-2008)

24%
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Disagreement in Methods
76%

Figure 7. Turkey-U.S. Relations (2002-2008).

On the other hand, after 2008 the proportion of cooperation and opposition changes
significantly. However, the even dispersion of cooperation and opposition complements the
argument of the first assumption. Also, the concentration of independent policies coincides with
the increase in national power, which suits the assumption number 3.
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Turkey-U.S. Relations (2008-2018)
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Figure 8. Turkey-U.S. Relations (2008-2018).

Finally, figure 9 depicts the overall relations and the proportion of cooperative vs. opposing
policies in different view.
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Figure 9. The American-Turkish Relations During the Unipolar Systemic Structure.
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Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior is Coherent with its Objectives. At the beginning of
the chapter, the study defined three primary objectives as (1) stabilize the region, (2) defuse
security risks, and (3) achieve economic development as the pillars for Turkish foreign policy. In
Figures 10 and 11 it is possible to detect the relation of the TFP with its objectives. For example,
Turkey has mostly preferred to cooperate with the U.S. to stabilize the region, defuse the security
risk and for economic gain (See figure 10).

Cooperation Areas of Turkey with the U.S. (1990-2018)
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Figure 10. Cooperation Areas of Turkey with the U.S. (1990-2018).

On the other hand, Turkey's opposition to the U.S. has internal and external security aspects
as well as economic concerns (Figure 11). From Turkey's perspective, it opposed the U.S. when it
perceived that American policies destabilized the region. Next, Turkey appears to be concerned
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with policies that may degrade the territorial integrity mainly due to the Kurdish issue.
Interestingly, relations seem to get strained when Turkey perceives that the U.S. is threatening the
political establishment over human rights issues, democratic values or acts in a supportive/passive
stance against the Turkey’s perceived internal threat. Finally, again it is observable that Turkey
values its economy as much as its security.

Opposition Areas of Turkey to the U.S. Policies (1990-2018
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Figure 11. Opposing areas of Turkey against the U.S. policies (1990-2018).

In figure 12, it is possible to observe how the increased material capability has affected
Turkey's stance after 2008. Although there is a need for further research to decide what the actual
effects of the Syrian Civil War and subsequent emergence of ISIS are on relations between the
U.S. and Turkey, the picture does not diverge from traditional trends except in the “military
cooperation” and the “threatening the political establishment” columns. It is observable that the
perception of the U.S. possible involvement and implicit support to the Gulen movement, which
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has become a central issue in interactions between two states, has significantly strained relations.
(Turkey's demand for Gulen's extradition has been repeatedly rejected.)

Effects of Material Capability on Turkey's Opposing Stance
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Figure 12. Effects of Material Capability on Turkey's Opposing Stance against the U.S.

Conclusion
This section of the work focuses on exploring the change in TFP by linking the national
objectives, which are the end state and primary motivation for the country’s action, with the
instruments to realize them.
Through empirical analysis, the study proves categorically that Turkey's national
objectives can be classified as "defusing security risks" and maintaining "economic development."
109

Also, the work shows that the level of cooperation vs. confrontation is not enough to claim that
Turkey has chosen another side or shifted away from the West. Instead, it depicts an independent
position. Moreover, the results of the research provide a sound correlation between the increased
material capability and the independent policy preferences of Turkey, which indicates that the
cause of change in TFP is structural.
The empirical research also provides a powerful prediction tool for future pathways of TFP.
It shows that Turkey’s national power is the primary variable for the methods of maximizing
national objectives. Notably, military power projection capability and economic growth appear to
be the leading factors for national decision-making. At the beginning of 2019, the national military
procurements reached 65%, and Turkey began domestically to produce modern arms that provide
power projection capabilities. The study predicts that from now on, the successful mobilization of
the domestic military industry will depend on the allocated defense funds and potential export
opportunities. Thus, the overall national economic health will be decisive in judging the degree of
Turkey’s regional assertiveness.
On the other hand, the U.S. National Security Policy and the subsequent National Defense
Strategy (2018) maintains attention on the Middle East, but prioritizes pivot to Asia and stress
realignment of resources for the forecasted major power competition. Therefore, the Middle East
becomes more peripheral to the U.S. interests while attracting more assertive Russia and China.
Consequently, the U.S. can adopt “restraint” as a regional grand strategy by narrowing its military
objectives, focusing on global access, and actively encouraging its allies to share defense burdens,
which can significantly diminish the U.S direct involvement and activist presence in the Middle
East.
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Since Turkey’s does not direct its opposition to the presence of the U.S. but against its
particular interventionist policies, the future interactions between the two allies may fold out based
on the economic condition of Turkey and the degree of U.S. activism. Accordingly, if the U.S.
activism remains strong and Turkey has a restrained economy, Ankara most likely will act less
assertive. However, it does not mean that it will be blindly cooperative. If Turkey maintains a
robust economic capability, then its objection to the U.S. policies will depend on the effects of
American policies on Turkish national objectives and the tactical decisions on how to achieve
them.

Table 10: Future projection of US-Turkey interactions in the Middle East

Cold War
(Major Power
Threat from
USSR)

1990-2008
(No existential
major power
threat, but
spillover
effects of the
U.S. policies)

2008-2018
(No
existential
major power
threat, but
spillover
effects of the
U.S. policies)

Strong US
presence

Strong US
Presence

Strong U.S.
presence

Strong U.S.
Presence

Weak U.S.
presence

Economic
Recession

Dependent
Cooperative
Non-assertive

Cooperative
Non-assertive

-

Less
assertive
but less
cooperative

Cooperative
Less
assertive

Strong
Economic
Growth

-

-

Independent
Assertive

2018(Future Projection)

Independent Cooperative
Assertive
Assertive

If the U.S. adopts restrain as its grand strategy and cease overactive policies that can
produce spillover effects detrimental to Turkey, then Ankara regardless of either limited or strong
economic growth will encourage cooperation with different level of assertiveness.
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The study assumes that except occasional bilateral disagreements the U.S. will not directly
threaten or target its ally Turkey as it does to Iran. However, Washington may deploy economic
sanctions to channel Ankara in a specific direction. In this case, regardless of the cost, Turkey most
likely will pursue varying degree of resistance against the U.S. on the vital issues such as territorial
integrity and threats to its political independence by adopting balancing strategies that involve
Russia, China or EU.
Turkey’s geostrategic position provides multidirectional freedom of movement, which
obstructs adversaries’ attempts of isolation and becomes suitable for Ankara to implementing
balancing strategies. Historically, beginning with the Crimea War in 1853, Ottomans and later the
Turkish Republic frequently balanced East and West against each other. If the U.S. actions begin
to pose a direct threat to Turkey, to preserve its regional role as an autonomous country, the strong
nationalistic sentiments may cause stiff resistance and induce any Turkish government to adopt
similar balancing strategies between the contemporary East (Russia, China) and the West (USA,
EU).
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CONCLUSION

Summary of the Findings
The primary purpose of the paper is to find out "why Turkish foreign policy has lost its
Western-centric orientation." From among the many different explanations in the literature, this
study claims that the change in TFP is structural. It posits that the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar
international system and growing national power has incentivized Turkey to deploy a self-help
approach that requires a high level of political and security activities to displace previous
arrangements.
First, the study proves that under the unipolar systemic structure, in the Middle East, states
with improved national power tend to act more independently vis a vis the policy preferences of
the unipole.
Second, it defines causes of change and argues that the transition to a neoliberal market
economy, within which growth and prosperity depend on exports, has increased Turkey's desire to
create mechanisms for global and local integration. However, perpetual regional conflicts have
continuously created domestic and regional security concerns that have interrupted this integration.
In time Turkey has realized that it is the unipole that disturbs regional stability the most. Although
the U.S. is an ally, it has created many spillover effects that were detrimental to Turkish national
interests. In response, Turkey has begun to vocalize a new security paradigm, in which the U.S. is
both an ally and a potential threat.
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Third, it formulates the objectives and the new concept of TFP. It argues that with the
beginning of the unipolar world order, since Turkey cannot wholly rely on the U.S. to defuse
perceived threats, policymakers preferred to manage Turkey's regional security needs by reducing
dependence on the U.S. and adopting a self-help approach. Yet, in order to displace previous
arrangements, TFP has begun to display unusual diplomatic activities, establishing new military
and economic links, and undertaking an active approach in conflict resolution.
Fourth, through empirical analysis, the study proves that growing material capabilities have
allowed Turkey to take an independent position and that its increased activism against the unipole
(system) is consistent with its national interests. When the rhetoric about the ideological
orientation of the administration is stripped from the context, it becomes clear that Turkey
prioritizes national interests rather than its strategic relationship with the U.S. Thus, the change in
TFP stems from the emergence of a more independent country, rather than an axis shifting Turkey.

Contributions to the Literature
The study offers three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it has developed
a snapshot of the current political spectrum of the Middle Eastern states through analyses of their
national power. It has developed a mechanism that integrates unipolar systemic pressures with
structural actualities (of the units and system) that provides explanatory power for regional states’
potential behavior. Also, it has proved that the nature of Middle Eastern international relations is
both hierarchic and anarchical.
Second, it has discovered that having a sound economy or formidable armed forces is not
an adequate prerequisite to act autonomously. Indeed, it is a combination of a relatively good
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economy and military that has power projection capabilities based on domestic arms production
that enables a state to act autonomously.
Finally, the empirical research in this study is the first in its category. Although there is
room to refine its results, the existing classification of the events, which is consistent with the
literature, provides a good understanding of the nature of the changing behavior of Turkey.
Moreover, by discovering the correlation between the objectives and observed activism, it proves
that half-way explanations that claim Turkey's actions are motivated by a desire to "increase
regional influence" as an end in itself do not reflect the reality. In other words, Turkey has clear
objectives and means to maximize them, rather than acting out of open-ended hegemonic purposes.

Future Research
In the literature, there is a consensus that Turkish foreign policy had been formulated with
an assumption of a benign environment, where neighborhood participation in defusing security
risks was expected. In that sense, the Arab uprising and consequent adverse outcomes were hardly
calculated. After the Arab Spring, authoritarianism was resurrected, and critical regional states
realigned themselves with the U.S., which has seriously challenged Turkey's ability to maximize
its objectives through an "independist" approach.
Yet, two critical structural effects need to be clarified for the future of TFP. First, the
emergence of near-peer competitors erodes the unipolar system, which has the potential to
diminish the regional influence of the unipole and allow better options for balancing. Second, the
newly discovered substantial energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have the potential to
boost the material capabilities of the regional states and break the energy monopoly of Russia over
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Europe. This may cause a sub-systemic change in the balance of power and create new regional
alliance systems that may have implications for Turkey’s ability to follow the autonomous path.
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